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Modeling and Veriﬁcation of Probabilistic Data-aware Business Processes
by LI Haizhou
There is a wide range of new applications that stress the need for business process mod-
els that are able to handle imprecise data. This thesis studies the underlying modelling
and analysis issues. It uses as formal model to describe process behaviours a labelled
transitions system in which transitions are guarded by conditions deﬁned over a proba-
bilistic database. To tackle veriﬁcation problems, we decompose this model to a set of
traditional automata associated with probabilities named as world-partition automata.
Next, this thesis presents an approach for testing probabilistic simulation preorder in
this context. A complexity analysis reveals that the problem is in 2-exptime, and is
exptime-hard, w.r.t. expression complexity while it matches probabilistic query eval-
uation w.r.t. data-complexity. Then P-LTL and P-CTL model checking methods are
studied to verify this model. In this context, the complexity of P-LTL and P-CTL model
checking is in exptime. Finally a prototype called ”PRODUS” which is a modeling and
veriﬁcation tool is introduced and we model a realistic scenario in the domain of GIS
(graphical information system) by using our approach.
Key words: probabilistic database, business processes, simulation relation test, model
checking.
Re´sume´
Un large e´ventail de nouvelles applications met l’accent sur la ne´cessite´ de disposer de
mode`les de processus me´tier capables de manipuler des donne´es impre´cises ou incer-
taines. Du fait de la pre´sence de donne´es probabilistes, les comportements externes de
tels processus me´tier sont non markoviens. Peu de travaux dans la litte´rature se sont
inte´resse´s a` la ve´riﬁcation de tels syste`mes. Ce travail de the`se e´tudie les questions
de mode´lisation et d’analyse de ce type de processus me´tier. Il utilise comme mode`le
formel pour de´crire les comportements des processus me´tier un syste`me de transitions
e´tiquete´es dans lequel les transitions sont garde´es par des conditions de´ﬁnies sur une
base de donne´es probabiliste. Il propose ensuite une approche de de´composition de ces
processus qui permet de tester la relation de simulation entre processus dans ce con-
texte. Une analyse de complexite´ re´ve`le que le proble`me de test de simulation est dans
2-EXPTIME, et qu’il est EXPTIME-diﬃcile en termes de complexite´ d’expression, alors
que du point de vue de la complexite´ en termes des donne´es, il n’engendre pas de surcouˆt
supple´mentaire par rapport au couˆt de l’e´valuation de requeˆtes boole´ennes sur des bases
de donne´es probabilistes. L’approche propose´e est ensuite e´tendue pour permettre la
ve´riﬁcation de proprie´te´s exprime´es dans les logiques P-LTL et P-CTL. Finalement, un
prototype, nomme´ ‘PRODUS’, a e´te´ imple´mente´ et utilise´ dans le cadre d’une appli-
cation lie´es aux syste`mes d’information ge´ographiques pour montrer la faisabilite´ de
l’approche propose´.
Mots-cle´s: bases de donne´es probabilistes, processus me´tier, relation de simulation,
ve´riﬁcation de mode`les.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In the domain of Business Process Management (BPM)[1, 2], the core is process mod-
elling and analysis. A business process is usually deﬁned as a collection of activities
performed in coordination to achieve a particular business goal [1]. The uses of busi-
ness process models have been spread from business scope (e.g., supply chain system)
to many other domains (e.g., agriculture, medicine). Following the numerous nouveau
demands, various process models [1, 2] have been proposed in the literature to describe
business processes ranging from theoretical models, which implement formal semantics
(e.g., transition systems, Petri nets, process algebras, EPC), to executable models (e.g.,
BPEL, XPDL, WS-CDL) or graphical ones (e.g., BPMN, activity diagrams of UML).
While most of existing models focus on control-ﬂow perspective (i.e., ordering and co-
ordination of activities), which is an essential dimension to describe business processes,
there has been over the last few years an increasing interest around the role played by
data in business processes. Indeed, in many applications the executions of processes,
as speciﬁed in a control-ﬂow, may be also governed by conditions deﬁned over vari-
ables or over a database. This motivates the emergence of data-aware and data-centric
perspectives for process modelling, approaches that promote data to ﬁrst-class citizens
in process models. The interest in these perspectives is driven by many applications in
which data plays a prominent role such as artifact-centric modelling of business processes
[3, 4], data-aware conformance and compliance checking [5, 6] of business processes as
well as data-centric web services [7].
However, whereas many traditional applications manipulate precise data, there is a wide
range of new applications that need to manage imprecise and uncertain data [8]. Many
sources of imprecision of data are possible, among them the following examples are worth
mentioning:
8
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• Nowadays, most business processes are collaborative, span across enterprises bound-
aries and, as a consequence, have to deal with data originated from multiple
sources. This raises information quality issues since data sources are usually het-
erogeneous and methods and frequency of collecting data vary depending on or-
ganizations and geographies [9]. In the sense that a same real world entity may
be represented diﬀerently in diﬀerent sources. Furthermore, data may be ”col-
lected with diﬀerent methods and frequency by diﬀerent departments, institutions,
and geographies” [9]. Data cleaning and source reconciliation are costly tasks,
in particular if the size of data is very large. As a consequence, in most of the
state-of-the-art, data integration approaches allow the data to be imprecise. For
example, as highlighted in [8], in business intelligence, imprecision is the price to
pay to reduce the cost of data cleaning. While the author of [9] explains that
many possible sources of uncertainty exist in BI applications, and this problem is
magniﬁed when data comes from multiple sources and is collected with diﬀerent
methods and frequency by diﬀerent departments, institutions, and geographies.
• Recently, several research works [10, 11] as well as industrial tools (e.g., Oracle’s
BPEL Sensor and IBM WebSphere Business sensor events) highlighted the need of
integrating sensor network data into business processes. Example of applications
include ﬂeet management and package tracking related to logistics processes [10]
or monitoring processes where sensors and actuators driven by a business process
are used to control large-scale physical systems (e.g., energy eﬃcient buildings
[11]). Data captured from the physical world using sensors, cameras is inherently
imprecise and uncertain.
• In many applications areas, e.g., healthcare, ﬁnancial services or business intelli-
gence, data is very sensitive and cannot be handled as it is by business processes.
Privacy regulations may impose various requirements such as anonymity, data
masking, obfuscation, or introduction of imprecision, (e.g., noise), to hide sensi-
tive information [8].
The aforementioned applications stress the need for business process models that are
able to handle imprecise data. We study in this thesis the underlying modelling and
analysis issues. We use as formal model to describe process semantics a Labelled Transi-
tions System (LTS) in which transitions are guarded by conditions deﬁned over a global
database which, in spirit of [8], contains an explicit representation of the uncertainty. We
call such a model a probabilistic data-aware business process (pd-process). Our choice of
LTSs is motivated by the prominent role played by this formalism for representing be-
haviours of systems. Indeed, LTSs form one of the most used types of models in process
theory [12] and they have also been used intensively in BPM and web services areas to
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support formal analysis of business processes [13]. We rest on recent developments in
the emerging ﬁeld of probabilistic databases [8, 14, 15] to include imprecise data within
labelled transitions systems and formally deﬁne the semantics of the obtained pd-process
model.
This dissertation focuses on the problem of modelling and analysing pd-processes. His-
torically, two principal methods of equal importance have been used in the literature to
analyse LTSs: temporal logic, used to verify whether a given process satisﬁes certain
properties and equivalence or preorder relations. In the ﬁrst class, Linear Temporal
Logic (LTL) and Computation Tree Logic (CTL) are normally considered to verify pro-
cess models. LTL is a logical formalism capturing linear time properties and it is a
fragment of CTL which allows branching time and qualiﬁers. By using these temporal
logic, model veriﬁcation or called model checking is wildly used to help process designers
to detect the defects of a model eﬀectively by verifying essential properties. Regarding
the second class of methods, simulation preorder is a reﬁnement relation on processes
that has been proved to be very useful in many applications. Simulation equivalence
plays a crucial role in model checking since it preserves relevant properties of many
temporal logics (e.g., CTL*) and hence can be exploited to minimize the state space
explored by veriﬁcation algorithms [16, 17]. Simulation equivalence has also been used
directly for veriﬁcation of business processes [18] as well as for web service analysis and
composition [19, 20].
1.1 Contribution
In this thesis, our contributions are as follows:
• We integrate probabilistic database with automata theories to propose a nouveau
process model, named ”Probabilistic data-aware business process model”, which
expands the usage domain of business process model. This model speciﬁes boolean
queries on probabilistic databases as guards which enrich the decision making and
bring another way to express probabilities in a labelled transition system. Indeed,
the general topic of this thesis is not totally new since a satisfactory veriﬁcation
theory for probabilistic processes has been a long-standing research problem and
numerous probabilistic process models have already been proposed in the litera-
ture [21]. Whereas most existing models assume a form of independence between
transition probabilities, in pd-processes there is an intricate correlation between
transitions due to the presence of guards over a probabilistic database. As a con-
sequence, pd-process semantics does not coincide with semantics of probabilistic
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processes previously described in the literature, which makes it diﬃcult to reuse
existing techniques to do simulation relation test in pd-processes.
• We propose a reﬁned approach to decompose a pd-process into a set of world par-
tition automata which can be seen as traditional automata with probability distri-
bution. This mechanism helps us to tackle veriﬁcation problems of pd-processes.
• A formal deﬁnition of simulation relation preorder in the context of pd-processes
is made into two dimensions: (i) semantic, in the sense that it is based on a con-
tainment relation between the possible execution trees of pd-processes, and (ii)
conservative, since it matches classical notion of simulation in non-probabilistic
case and a reﬁnement approach that enables to characterize simulation preorder
in pd-processes. With the help of world partition automata, we can reuse tradi-
tional method of simulation relation and model checking to verify the model of
pd-processes. The complexity of simulation test is studied in the dimensions of
expression complexity and data complexity. We prove that the size of probabilistic
database does not produce any overhead w.r.t the data complexity and establish
upper and lower bound of expression complexity.
• By reusing the traditional model checking algorithms in the literature, we produce
a sort of veriﬁcation algorithms in the context of linear temporal logic (LTL)
and computational tree logic (CLT) as well as their probabilistic counterpart
Probabilistic-LTL (P-LTL) and Probabilistic-CTL (P-CTL). Owing to the reﬁne-
ment of pd-processes a pd-process can be reconstructed with a set of normal
automata where every automaton is associated with a probability. So the tradi-
tional model checking algorithms in the context of LTL or CTL can be applied
in the reﬁnement structures of pd-processes. Then the complexity of LTL model
checking on pd-processes is proved that there is no overhead w.r.t the complexity
of traditional LTL model checking but the CTL model checking on pd-processes
reaches exponential.
• We provide several optimized simulation relation algorithms of pd-processes. Firstly,
we classify pd-processes to three scopes: deterministic pd-processes, pseudo deter-
ministic pd-processes and strong non-deterministic pd-processes. If a pd-process
is a deterministic pd-process or a pseudo-deterministic pd-process, the complexity
of testing simulation relation is in EXPTIME. Besides, we introduces a special
case: the simulation relation test on a compiled approach when only the content
of query or database is altered.
• A pd-process can be considered as a Markov process if it satisﬁes some properties.
We propose the notion of independent pd-processes to build the bridge of linking
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pd-processes and Markov processes. Meanwhile, the complexity of simulation test
and model checking over independent pd-processes can be decreased, for example:
the complexity of simulation relation on independent pd-processes is in PTIME
rather than EXPTIME.
• We design and implement a probabilistic data-aware business process framework
abbreviated as PRODUS which is a pd-process model and veriﬁcation tool.
PRODUS provides a graphical user interface to visualize designers’ process build-
ing and links a probabilistic system which is powered by PostgreSQL. Meanwhile,
PRODUS is capable to test the preorder relation and model veriﬁcation (LTL,
CTL, P-LTL and P-CTL) in the context of pd-processes. Due to the lack of the
intersection algorithm of probabilistic boolean queries in the literature, an algo-
rithm of intersecting probabilistic boolean queries is devised to fulﬁl the needs
from preorder relation test.
1.2 Overview of Dissertation
This dissertation is organized as follows:
• Chapter 2 introduces some background knowledge: (i) probabilistic database, this
part brieﬂy depicts the semantic of probabilistic database in the sense of possi-
ble worlds and an example related to the car insurance risk analysis introduced
in the motivation, (ii) simulation relation testing algorithm, the traditional pre-
order relation testing algorithm by [22], (iii) model checking algorithms, in this
subsection, the model veriﬁcation algorithms in the context of LTL, P-LTL, CTL,
P-CTL are introduced respectively, including their syntax, semantics, algorithms
and complexity discussions.
• In Chapter 3, we propose a formal deﬁnition of probabilistic data-aware business
process, and we discuss its semantic in terms of possible execution trees. The main
concepts of pd-processes are explained through an example of car insurance risk
analysis. Then we reﬁne the structure of pd-processes to a ﬁnite set of partition
automata which will be useful to facilitate veriﬁcation algorithms for pd-processes.
• The probabilistic simulation relation algorithm is described in Chapter 4. This
chapter provides the deﬁnition of simulation relation preorder in the context of pd-
process in terms of possible execution trees but this deﬁnition cannot devise a direct
algorithm because the number of possible execution trees may be inﬁnite. Then,
we discuss the complexity of this preorder relation algorithm in two dimensions:
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expression complexity in terms of the size of pd-processes and data complexity
w.r.t the volume of probabilistic database. Meanwhile, Chapter 4 describes the
model checking methods of pd-processes in the context of various temporal logics:
LTL, P-LTL, CTL, P-CTL. By reusing the reﬁnement structure of pd-processes
the traditional model veriﬁcation algorithms can be used with slight modiﬁcations.
• Chapter 5 discusses several optimized algorithms of simulation relation test over
pd-processes. Finally, we study the relation between pd-processes and Markov
processes. The notion of independent pd-processes reveals a fact that if a pd-
process satisﬁes some properties, it is a Markov process: complexity of veriﬁcation
can be reduced.
• Chapter 6 discusses the related work and the diﬀerences between these works with
our contributions.
• Chapter 7 introduces the prototype PRODUS, the modelling of agricultural en-
vironmental risk analysis and several experiment result: system performance of
simulation relation test by inputting synthetic data and realistic information from
the agricultural scenario, model checking results of this scenario by inputting some
properties in terms of LTL, P-LTL, CTL and P-CTL respectively.
Chapter 2
Preliminary
This chapter provides several pieces of background material for this dissertation: the
notion of probabilistic database, a brief introduction about the labelled transition system
which is speciﬁed as ﬁnite state machine in this thesis, the notion of Markov processes,
the deﬁnition of simulation preorder relation, and the theories of model checking.
Motivation example
In this thesis, we consider an example of a business process used by an insurance company
as a running example. A main business goal of a company is to ensure that revenues must
be greater than expenses. In the case of an insurance company, a large part of revenues
come from customer premiums while the largest expenses are related to the payment
of claims. Therefore, calculation of insurance rates is of high importance and depends
on a number of diﬀerent factors. The main business objective is to calculate premiums
that are adequate, in order to maintain company solvency, and which are as much as
possible fair compared to the risk, in order for example to avoid loosing clients who may
be attempted to move to cheaper competitor companies. Now the problem is how to
set a reasonable price for every candidate. Normally, car insurance companies will let
their insurance applicants to ﬁll a complex form with a variety of personal information,
such as driving history, gender, age, education level, and record this information in the
database. Then the statistic should ﬁnd the association between these driver personal
information with the ﬁnancial risk. If we assume that all this information correctly
reﬂect the truth situation of candidates, we could approximate the probabilities of a
combination of principle criteria impacting the ﬁnance risk. Then the problem comes
to us, how can we build an eﬀective business process and reﬂect the probabilistic data
inﬂuencing the decisions in this business process.
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Teacher Course
Tom History
@ French
Pascal @
Teacher Course
Tom History
〈Mary,Susan〉 French
Pascal 〈 Biology, Chemistry〉
Table 2.1: Example of incomplete databases
2.1 Probabilistic database
The issues underlying management of imprecision and uncertainty in data have attracted
the attention of the research community since a long time. Several models have been
proposed over the time to handle uncertain data [9, 23]. In recent years, the ﬁeld of
probabilistic databases gained momentum under the driving force of a wide spectrum of
new applications [8, 14, 15].
Because relational database is designed to be capable to store incomplete data at the very
beginning, the model and theory of incomplete database was birthed to fulﬁl the needs of
representing and querying incomplete data which is stored in relational databases. The
original work was captured in [24] on Codd, c-, v-tables with their conditional tables
and introduced the notion of representation system. Intuitively, incomplete database
is a relational database which contains incomplete data (missing data as well as ”Or-
set” value). Table 2.1 illustrates an example of diﬀerent presentation of incomplete
databases: Null value and ”Or-set” value. In the left table, @ represents null value
and this table is a Codd table [24]; 〈Mary,Susan〉 is a ”Or-set” value, showing that
both ”Mary” or ”Susan” are possible values. Incomplete database can be seen as a
(inﬁnite) set of complete databases. These complete databases represent states of real
world. The incomplete database may be inﬁnite and hard to manipulate. So we need
a tool to describe the inﬁnite databases in a ﬁnite way which we could manipulate and
query. Because of this reason, a representing sytem is created to represent the incomplete
information. We denote the < T, rep,Ω > as a representing system. T stands for a set of
multi tables < T1, T2, . . . Tn > and it can be used like a model to represent the incomplete
information. rep(T ) is denoted as the set of possible relations that T represents. rep
deﬁnes a mapping from T to rep(T ) or we can say a mapping from Tab(R) to Inc(R).
If R is a relation scheme, Tab(R) presents the set of all tables on R and Inc(R) is the
power set of all the set of relations on R. Ω stands for a set of relational operators such
as projection, selection, etc. After the work of Imielinski and Lipski [24], later work
on incomplete database has focused on the notion of possible or certain answers [25],
completeness of query [26]. Meanwhile, the study of incomplete information is not only
limited in the domain of relational database but also extended to XML ﬁle system [27].
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By extending the notions of incomplete database, probabilistic database is birthed to
manage probabilistic data. The original work of probabilistic database can be derived
in 80s in [28] where attributes are random variables. Then in [29], the probability
was considered as an uncertain value of an attribute and the method of evaluation of
select-join queries was also studied in this paper. Later on, the semantic of possible
worlds were deﬁned in [30] and an approach to ensure eﬃcient query evaluation by
relaxing the probabilistic semantic was studied in [31]. Then the concept of probabilistic
schema (by-table or by-tuple) was described in [32]. Nowadays, there has been plenty of
researches over probabilistic database by extending previous result to expand the ﬁeld
of probabilistic database [8, 14, 15].
The application of probabilistic database currently focused on managing uncertain sci-
entiﬁc information. In [33], a Probabilistic Tree Database based on a probabilistic XML
model has been designed to fulﬁl the needs in the domain of biology. Later on, an
application named BioRank was proposed in [34] for exploratory queries on tracking
the uncertainties by joining information from various data source . This system is used
to predict protein functions and considers the uncertainty in the domain of scientiﬁc
data integration. They revealed the advantage of consideration of probabilities to han-
dle vogue problem and to manage uncertain data. Currently, there are various project
relating to probabilistic database such as Trio [23] which manages uncertain data and
data lineage, MystiQ [8] that is a probabilistic query evaluation prototype. Then ﬂurry
of DBMS of probabilistic database are developed, for example the systems for conjunc-
tive queries: MayBMS [35], PrDB [36], ORION [37], and SPROUT [38] which supports
full relational algebra. Next section will present another application ”Spatial relation”
which uses probabilistic database to manage uncertainty over agricultural plots with
vague boundaries in the domain of geography.
The remaining section introduces some basic concepts of the theory of probabilistic
databases [8, 14, 15]. We assume the reader familiar with basic database concepts (e.g.,
see [39] for details). In this thesis, we are interested in particular by probabilistic re-
lational databases deﬁned over a ﬁnite domain. Informally, a probabilistic database is
deﬁned as a database that includes relations whose tuples are associated with probabil-
ities.
Deﬁnition 2.1. A ﬁnite probability space is a pair (Ω, P r) where Ω is the ﬁnite set
of outcomes, and Pr : Ω → [0, 1] s.t. ∑
ω∈Ω
Pr(ω) = 1. For A ⊆ Ω, we take Pr(A) =
∑
ω∈A
Pr(ω). A set {t1, ..., tn} ⊆ Ω is independent if Pr(t1, ..., tn) = Pr(t1)× . . .×Pr(tn).
In the example of car insurance company, to evaluate the risk and to help managers to
insight the homogeneous criteria of candidates, the probabilistic database is an ideal tool
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Relation Applicant
ID Name Age Educ. Lev Lic Year Driv.Rec City Pr
t1 C101 Jack 20 college 3 medium paris 1
Relation Proﬁt
AgeMin AgeMax Educ. Lev Lic Year Driv. Rec City Proﬁt Pr
t2 25 50 college 3 medium Paris high 60%
t3 20 30 college 3 medium Paris medium 50%
t4 18 25 college 3 none Paris low 60%
t5 45 70 high school 10 minor Lyon high 70%
Relation Risk
AgeMin AgeMax Educ. Lev Lic Year Driv. Rec City Lev.Risk Pr
t6 18 25 college 3 medium Paris high 30%
t7 20 35 college 3 medium Paris medium 80%
t8 30 55 college 3 medium Paris low 40%
t9 45 70 high school 10 minor Lyon high 50%
Table 2.2: Example of a probabilistic database (Dins).
to reveal the relation of diﬀerent attributes combinations. Table 2.2 shows an example
of a probabilistic database1, noted Dins, in the ﬁeld of insurance risk assessment. The
database Dins contains three relations: Applicant, Proﬁt and Risk. The Applicant relation
is used to store information about an application of a new customer. The Proﬁt relation
is used to record the proﬁt insurance companies forecast depending on drivers proﬁles
such as age, level of education, number of licence years and city. The relation Risk
records statistical information about levels of ﬁnancial risk in association with drivers
proﬁles. Such information could be, for example, computed from an analysis of the
history of claims maintained by an insurance company. The content of the relation
Proﬁt and Risk is indeed not certain and, hence, the two relations record a conﬁdence
with each prediction or analysis result. This is materialised by the attribute Pr in
each relation which associate a probability with each tuple in a (probabilistic) relation
(i.e., Pr gives the marginal probability of each tuple). In this example, proﬁt forecast
reveals that senior drivers living in the city of Lyon are likely to generate a high level
of proﬁt. This information is captured by the tuple t5 of the relation Proﬁt which has a
probability equal to 70%. The standard semantics of probabilistic databases is deﬁned
based on the notion of possible worlds. The intuition is that the precise content of
a probabilistic database is unknown but instead the ﬁnite set of potential instances,
each with some probability, can be computed. Continuing with the previous example,
Table 2.3 shows some possible worlds (i.e., instances) of the probabilistic database Dins
(the total number of all the possible worlds is 28). Hence, a probabilistic database
can be viewed as a probabilistic distribution over a ﬁnite set of possible (complete)
databases. Given a probabilistic database D, we denote by W(D) the ﬁnite set of
1In this example, and only for illustration purposes, tuples are assumed to be independent (e.g., this
is why the sum of probabilities of the tuples t2 and t3 of relation Proﬁt is > 1). Such an assumption is
not mandatory for the proposed approach.
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World ID Possible World Pr
W1 φ 0.1008%
W2 Applicant = {t1}, P rofit = {t2, t4}, Risk = {t7} 0.9072%
W3 Applicant = {t1}, P rofit = {t2, t4}, Risk = {t6, t7} 0.3888%
W4 Applicant = {t1}, P rofit = {t2, t3, t4}, Risk = {t7} 0.9072%
W5 Applicant = {t1}, P rofit = {t3}, Risk = {t6} 0.0648%
W6 Applicant = {t1}, P rofit = {t5}, Risk = {t6} 0.1008%
W256 Applicant = {t1}, P rofit = {t2, t3, t4, t5}, Risk = {t6, t7, t8, t9} 0.6048%
Table 2.3: Some possible worlds of the probabilistic database Dins.
its possible worlds (i.e., its possible instances). Formally, a probabilistic database D
deﬁnes a ﬁnite probability space (W(D), P r), whose set of outcomes W(D) form all
the possible instances of the probabilistic database D. Each possible world W ∈ W(D)
is associated with a probability given by Pr(W ), with
∑
W∈W(D)
Pr(W ) = 1.We recall
that conjunctive queries correspond to queries that can be formulated using the Select-
Project-Join operators of the relational algebra and they form the most used fragment
of existing relational query languages. We focus our attention on boolean queries,
Given such a framework, a crucial question is then related to query evaluation, i.e., the
problem of calculating the probability of tuples occurring in query answers [15]. In this
thesis, we are interested in particular by boolean queries, i.e., queries that return as
unique answers either true or false. When needed in the examples, we use a Datalog-like
notation to write boolean queries [39]. For example, using the database depicted at
Table 2.2, the query:
q1() :- Applicant( , , A, , , , ), Risk(A1, A2, , , , , R),
A1 ≤ A ≤ A2, R =′ high′
expresses a join between the relation Applicant and the tuples of the relation Risk having
a level of risk equal to ’high’ and using as join condition the ages of applicants which
must be included between the min and max ages of the relation Risk. In the query q1, the
letters A,A1, A2 and R denote variables while the symbol ′ ′ is used to denote anonymous
variables. When evaluated on a conventional database instance I, the query q1 returns
true if there is at least one tuple of Applicant that can be joined with an adequate tuple
of Risk (in this case we write q1(I) = true). Otherwise, the query q1 returns false (i.e.,
q1(I) = false). In the context of a probabilistic database (W(D), P r), the problem of
the evaluation of a boolean query q consists in computing the probability of query q
to return as answer the value true. Such a probability is deﬁned as follows Pr(q) =
∑
W∈W(D)|
q1(W )=true
Pr(W ). In other words, Pr(q) is given by the sum of the probabilities of all
the possible worlds where q is evaluated to true. However, in most practical situations
it is not feasible to compute the set W(D) and then explicitly evaluate a query q on
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each world in W(D). Indeed, W(D) is usually very large (e.g., in our toy probabilistic
database of Table 2.2, the number of possible worlds is already 28). To cope with this
problem, existing works have developed techniques to eﬃciently evaluate queries on
concise representations of probabilistic databases [8, 14, 15]. Not surprisingly, there is
a trade-oﬀ between the expressiveness of the representation model and computational
tractability of query evaluation. This is why, most existing works adopt some restricting
assumptions, often expressed as a form of independence of tuples [8]. There are also some
few approaches that support modelling complex correlations in probabilistic databases
[14, 15].
It is worth mentioning that, while we rely on existing techniques to handle probabilistic
data, our approach remains insensitive w.r.t. the assumptions underlying the repre-
sentation model. We require only a system that is able to evaluate boolean queries
over a probabilistic database, a requirement which is within the reach of most existing
probabilistic database management systems.
2.2 Finite state machine
The deﬁnition of a ﬁnite state machine is given as follows. A ﬁnite state machine is a
tuple A = (S, s0, Act,Δ, F, L,AP ), where:
• S is a ﬁnite set of states, with s0 ∈ S, the starting state.
• Act is a ﬁnite set of actions or activities.
• Δ ⊆ S ×Act× S, the transition relations, is a set of guarded transitions.
• F ⊆ S is the set of ﬁnal states.
• AP is a set of atomic propositions.
• L is a function L : S → 2AP .
s0
a−→ s1 stands for the transition relation from s0 to s1 assigned by action a. The
intuition of an automaton can be depicted as follows. Initial state s0 is the start of the
system and F is a set of ﬁnal states which are the terminator of the system. Δ is the
set of transition relations which represent a fact that: if s is the current state, then a
transition s
a−→ s′ originating from s is selected non-deterministically and taken, then the
action a is performed and the transition system evolves from state s into the state s′.
This selection procedure will be repeated until a ﬁnal state is encountered. Meanwhile,
this procedure is non-deterministic when a state has more than one outgoing transition.
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Function L relates a set L(s) ∈ 2AP of atomic propositions to any state si ∈ S. L(s)
represents the satisfaction of those atomic propositions ap ∈ AP by corresponding state
s. Noticing that one state may be expressed by one or many atomic propositions. For
a state si L(si) = {api1 , ..., apij}. A path π is a ﬁnite sequence of states, actions and
transition relations π = s0
a0−→ s1 a1−→ s2... an−1−−−→ sn. We can also use π[0, ..., n] represent
the whole path and π[i, ..., j] stand for a sub path si
ai−→ si+1... aj−1−−−→ sj . Paths(s)
represents a set of outgoing paths from state s.
2.3 Markov processes
Following the description in [40], the notions of discrete probability space and Markov
processes are deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 2.2 (Probability space). A probability space is a triple (Ω, F, Pr) where Ω
is a set, F is a collection of subsets of Ω, and Pr is a function from F to [0, 1] such that
Pr(Ω) = 1 and for any collection {Ci}i of at most countably many pairwise disjoint
elements of F , Pr(
⋃
Ci) =
∑
iCi.
A probability space Ω, F, Pr is discrete if F = 2Ω and for each C ⊆ Ω, Pr(C) =
∑
x∈C Pr(x), x is an element of C.
Deﬁnition 2.3 (Markov process). A Markov process A is an automaton (S, s0, Act,Δ,
P robs(S × Act)) whose transition relation Δ is a subset of S × Probs(S × Act) where
Probs(S ×Act) is a discrete probability space (Ω, F, Pr) such that Ω ⊆ S ×Act.
From the deﬁnition of Markov processes, the transitions from the same state are exclusive
and the ones from same state are independent, meaning that the probability of current
state never inﬂuence the predictions of successor transitions.
2.4 Simulation preorder relation
A simulation preorder relation test is to check the containment between two ﬁnite state
machines. According to [22], the deﬁnition of simulation preorder relation is deﬁned as
follows. Let A = (S, s0, Act,Δ, F, L,AP ) and A
′ = (S′, s′0, Act′,Δ′, F ′, L′, AP ′) be two
ﬁnite state machines. Then, A is simulated by A′, noted A  A′, iﬀ: ∀si ∈ S, si ai−→ sj ,
∃s′i ∈ S′ such that s′i
a′i−→ s′j , ai = a′i. The algorithm of simulation relation test[22] is
represented in Appendix.
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2.5 Model checking
Model checking [17] is a technique which automatically checks a given system to satisfy
some properties by converting these properties from natural language to temporal logics.
The underlying nature of time in temporal logics can be either linear or branching. In
the linear view, at each moment in time there is a single successor moment, whereas
in the branching view it has a branching, tree-like structure, where time may split into
alternative courses. Both temporal logics provide us a diﬀerent perspective to consider
the properties of a system. In this thesis, the methods of model checking will focus on
linear temporal logic (LTL), probabilistic linear temporal logic (P-LTL), computation
tree logic (CTL) and probabilistic computation tree logic (P-CTL). Following the meth-
ods described in [17], the traditional algorithms of model checking as well as syntax and
some important notions are depicted in this section. To be clear, the operators of model
checking are ﬁrstly explained as follows.
• ©:next;
• U :until;
• :always (now and for ever in the future);
• ♦:eventually (eventually in the future).
2.5.1 LTL model checking
Linear temporal logic (LTL) is a logical formalism specifying linear temporal properties
to check the satisfaction of paths in a ﬁnite state system. The syntax of LTL is depicted
as follows:
Φ  true|ap|ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2|¬ϕ| © ϕ|ϕ1 ∪ ϕ2 (2.1)
The semantic of LTL formulae is depicted as follows:
• π  true.
• π  ap iﬀ ap ∈ AP1.
• π  ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 iﬀ π  ϕ1 and π  ϕ2.
• π  ¬ϕ iﬀ π  ϕ.
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• π ©ϕ iﬀ π[1...n]  ϕ.
• π  ϕ1 ∪ ϕ2 iﬀ ∃j  0. π[j...]  ϕ2 and π[i...]  ϕ1 for all 0  i < j
The LTL model checking algorithm is described below. This algorithm uses the notion of
Buchi automata [17] which is a type of ω-automaton, which extends a ﬁnite automaton
to inﬁnite inputs. It accepts an inﬁnite input sequence if there exists a run of the
automaton that visits (at least) one of the ﬁnal states inﬁnitely often.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm of LTL model checking [17]
Require:
A transition system A = (S, s0, Act,Δ, AP, L) and LTL formula ϕ over AP .
Ensure:
1: Construct a Non-deterministic Buchi Automata NBA¬ϕ such that L(NBA¬ϕ) =
Words(¬ϕ).
2: Construct the product A⊗NBA¬ϕ.
3: If there exists an accepted sequence (for example, a path Π) in A⊗NBA¬ϕ, it means
the model checking will return ”false” with a counterexample.
4: return True or false.
The complexity of LTL model checking is EXPTIME with respect to the size of LTL
formula. According to [17], the time complexity of LTL model checking is in O(|TS| ×
2|ϕ|) where |TS| is the size of automata and |ϕ| is the size of give LTL formula. We
introduce the notion of Probabilistic LTL (P-LTL). The syntax of P-LTL is same with
the one of LTL. According to [41], an informal deﬁnition of P-LTL model checking is as
follows: for a given ﬁnite state automaton A and a LTL formula ϕ, A ∼pr ϕ, pr ∈ [0, 1].
We say A satisﬁes ϕ in a state s with probability ∼ pr iﬀ every path starting from
s satisﬁes ϕ with probability ∼ pr.(∼ means =, <,>,,). The algorithm of P-LTL
model checking is not used in this thesis. It is presented in Appendix.
2.5.2 CTL model checking
Computation tree logic [17] was birthed to overcome the shortage of LT properties which
only consider linear notion of time other than branching one. Branching notion of time
is a principle property of ﬁnite state automata. CTL is a temporal logic based on
propositional logic with a discrete notion of time, and only future modalities. It is an
important branching temporal logic that is suﬃciently expressive for the formulation of
an important set of system properties. The syntax of CTL model checking diﬀers from
the one of LTL with respect to branching parameters. There are two kinds of formulae
for CTL: state formulae and path formulae. The grammar of state formulae is as follows:
Φ  true|ap|Φ1 ∧ Φ2|¬Φ|∀ϕ|∃ϕ (2.2)
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where ap is an atomic proposition and ϕ represents a path formulae. The grammar of
path formulae shows below:
ϕ ©Φ|Φ1UΦ2 (2.3)
Similar with LTL model checking, the semantic of CTL checking also needs some satisfac-
tion relations. The diﬀerence is on the fact that CTL has two types formulae. Therefore
there are two types of satisfaction relations: for state formulae and for path formulae.
Let ap ∈ AP be an atomic proposition, an automaton A = (S, s0, Act,Δ, F, L,AP ). The
satisfaction relation for state formulae is deﬁned as follows.
• s  ap iﬀ ap ∈ L(S).
• s  Φ1 ∧ Φ2 iﬀ s  Φ1 and s  Φ2.
• s  ¬Φ iﬀ s  Φ.
• s  ∃ϕ iﬀ π  ϕ for some π ∈ Paths(s).
• s  ∀ϕ iﬀ π  ϕ for all π ∈ Paths(s).
The satisfaction relation for path formulae is deﬁned by:
• π ©ϕ iﬀ π[1]  ϕ.
• π  ϕ1 ∪ ϕ2 iﬀ ∃j  0. π[j]  ϕ2 and π[i]  ϕ1 for all 0  i < j
The basic algorithm of CTL model checking [17] is to verify a given ﬁnite state automata
and CTL formulae Φ if LTS  Φ. The general step of CTL model checking is as follows,
if Sat(Φ) = {s ∈ S|s  Φ} and Sub(Φ) is a set of sub-formulae of Φ:
• Input: a given ﬁnite state automata and CTL formulae Φ.
• Build the parse tree 2. For Φ, divided Φ into a set of sub-formulae denoted as
Sub(Φ). The atomic formulae are depicted as Equation 2.4.
• For each Ψi ∈ Sub(Φ), ﬁnd Sat(Ψi) = {s ∈ S|s  Ψi}.
• Accumulate the consequences to get Sat(Φ) = ⋂(Sat(Ψi)).
• Finally, we get LTS′  Φ where s ∈ SLTS′ also s ∈ Sat(Φ).
2The nodes of the parse tree represent the sub-formulae of Φ. The leaves stand for the constant true
or an atomic proposition a ∈ AP . All inner nodes are labeled with an operator
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The following equation illustrates the atomic formulae for CTL model checking.
Φ  true|ap|Φ1 ∧ Φ2|¬Φ|∃Φ|∃ © Φ|∃(Φ1 ∪ Φ2) (2.4)
The complexity of CTL model checking is in PTIME with respect to the size of CTL
formula. According to [17], the time complexity of CTL model checking is in O(|TS| ×
|Φ|) where |TS| is the size of automata and |Φ| is the size of give CTL formula.
2.5.3 P-CTL model checking
P-CTL is CTL model checking in probabilistic system. It introduces a new operator for
the CTL model checking as P∼pr(φ). Similar to CTL, the grammars of state formulae
and path formulae are described as follows:
Φ  true|ap|Φ1 ∧ Φ2|¬Φ|P∼pr(φ) (2.5)
where P∼pr(φ means φ is true with probability pr, pr ⊆ [0, 1], ∼∈ {<,>,,}.
ϕ ©Φ|Φ1 ∪ Φ2|Φ1 ∪n Φ2 (2.6)
For the non-probabilistic operators, the method of P-CTL model checking is similar
with the one of CTL in spite of considering quantitative results. As to the probabilistic
operator P , it needs to compute the probability Prob(s, φ) for every state such that
Sat(P∼pr(φ)) = {s ∈ S|Prob(s, φ) ∼ pr}, Prob(s, φ) denoting the probability of s which
satisﬁes φ.
Chapter 3
Model description
This chapter describes the notion of probabilistic data-aware business process model
(pd-processes in short) in detail. The semantic of pd-processes is introduced in terms of
possible execution trees and the notion of world-partition automata is proposed to help
us to verify pd-process model in the next chapter.
3.1 Probabilistic data-aware business process model
In this section, we continue using the example of car insurance company to illustrate
our probabilistic data-aware business process framework. Roughly speaking, the business
process calculates insurance rates using three diﬀerent procedures depending on risk and
proﬁt factors: (i) if the associated risk is considered low, then a premium is calculated
and either a quote is automatically elaborated and proposed to the customer (if the
forecast proﬁt is at least medium) or submitted for approval to a human expert, or (ii)
if the associated risk is considered medium, then a premium is calculated and either a
quote is automatically elaborated and proposed to the customer (if the forecast proﬁt is
high) or submitted for approval to a human expert, (iii) if the associated risk is considered
as high, in this case an advanced approval procedure is required. Insurance companies
usually try to improve their risk management by using probabilistic risk analysis and
proﬁt forecasts. For example, the probabilistic database depicted at Table 2.3 could be
used by the business process of ﬁgure 3.1 to provide better estimates for premiums.
We present below a formal deﬁnition of the notion of probabilistic data-aware business
processes (pd-processes).
Deﬁnition 3.1 (probabilistic data-aware process). A probabilistic data-aware process
(pd-process) is a tuple A = (S, s0, D,Act,G,Δ, F, AP,L), where:
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• S is a ﬁnite set of states, with s0 ∈ S, the starting state.
• D is a probabilistic database with possible worlds W(D).
• Act is a ﬁnite set of actions or activities.
• G is a ﬁnite set of guards deﬁned as boolean queries over the database D.
• Δ ⊆ S ×Act×G× S, the transition relations, is a set of guarded transitions.
• F ⊆ S is the set of ﬁnal states.
• AP is a set of atomic propositions.
• L is a labelling function L : S → 2AP .
Figure 3.1: PremCalc: an insurance premiums calculation business process.
Figure 3.1 shows a graphical representation of a premiums calculation pd-process, called
PremCalc. This process uses the insurance probabilistic database Dins given at Table
2.2. At the beginning, the PremCalc process is at the initial state Starting. Then, de-
pending on the risk level associated with the current applicant, PremCalc moves to one
of the states Premium Calculation, Application Evaluation or High Risk Application. This
conditional move is speciﬁed using transitions guards expressed as boolean queries over
the probabilistic database Dins. For example, the transition labelled ‘q3 | Rapid Evalua-
tion’ from state Starting to state Premium Calculation speciﬁes that when the PremCalc
process is at state Starting and the guard q3 is true, then PremCalc may execute the
activity Rapid Evaluation and moves to state Premium Calculation. At this stage, two
observations are worth to mention. First, note that pd-processes are non-deterministic
processes as it can be observed in the example where the two transitions outgoing from
Chapter 3. Model description 27
state Premium Calculation have non exclusive guards. This means that the applications
that are at state Premium Calculation and which satisfy the guard q4 may be either
processed automatically, i.e., a quote is automatically elaborated and sent to the cus-
tomer without requiring any approval (transition Express Approaval) or may require a
manual approval (transition Approval Request). Second, the presence of probabilities
in the database makes process executions probabilistic. For example, the execution of
the transitions ‘q3 | Rapid Evaluation’ is determined by the probability of its guard q3
(i.e., the probability to have q3 evaluated to true). Hence, the pd-process PremCalc
can be viewed as a probabilistic process with probabilities associated with transitions.
As discussed below (c.f., notion of possible execution trees), probabilities of transitions
determine the branching choices available during a given process execution. Moreover,
it should be noted that probabilities of transitions are not independent. Arbitrary and
complex correlations between transitions probabilities may arise depending on the con-
sidered probabilistic database and on the connections that exist between transitions
guards (e.g., disjoint guards, containment, overlapping, ...).
To illustrate veriﬁcation method in latter chapters clearly, a naive example is provide as
follows. Figure 3.2(a) shows another variant of a premium calculation business process,
called NormCalc. This process evaluates customers’ applications using a simpler proce-
dure which starts by launching the activity NormalRiskEvaluation. Then, two cases are
possible to terminate an execution: (i) for an applicant whose age and city belong to a
category where the forecast proﬁt is reasonable (c.f., guard q′2), an express approval is
authorized (ii) for an applicant whose driving record and city belong to a category with
an acceptable level of risk (c.f., guard q′1), a manual approval is then requested. Figure
3.2(b) shows the set of all possible execution trees of the process NormCalc.
Figure 3.2: Another insurance premium calculation business process.
Semantic
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Various classes of process semantics have been studied in the literature [42]. A line
of demarcation between existing semantics lies in the distinction between linear time
and branching time semantics. When processes are compared with respect to branching
time semantics execution paths as well as branching structures of processes must be
taken into account. Usually, simulation preorder is used in the literature as a relation to
compare processes with respect to their branching structures [42]. Following branching
time semantics, possible executions allowed by a process are characterized in terms of
trees, called execution trees, instead of paths. In a nutshell, execution trees of a process
A capture all the executions paths of A as well as the branching structures of A. In
the case of pd-processes, execution trees depend on the evaluation of guards which is
determined by the considered possible world of the probabilistic database.
As an example, Figure 3.3 shows some execution trees of the process PremCalc in the
possible worlds W256 and W2. The presented trees are complete execution trees since
their leaves are made of ﬁnal states. Hence, each branch in these trees that starts
from the root and ends at a leaf forms an execution path of the process PremCalc
in the considered world. For instance, the sequence of activities NormalRiskEvalua-
tion.ApprovalRequest.Premium Modiﬁcation.Approved, which appears as a branch in the
execution tree T3, is a possible execution path of the process PremCalc in the world
W256. In addition, an execution tree captures the branching structures of a process.
For example, tree T3 shows that after the execution of the activity RapidEvaluation, the
process PremCalc will have a choice to either execute the activity ExpressApproval or the
activity ApprovalRequest.
To formally deﬁne the notions of execution trees, we use the following deﬁnition of a
tree: A tree is a set τ ⊆ N∗ such that if xn ∈ τ , for x ∈ N∗ and n ∈ N, then x ∈ τ and
xm ∈ τ for all 0 ≤ m < n. The elements of τ represent nodes: the empty word  is
the root of τ , and for each node x, the nodes of the form xn, for n ∈ N, are children of
x. Given a pair of sets L and M , an 〈L,M〉-labelled tree is a triple (τ, λ, δ), where τ is
a tree, λ : τ → L is a node labelling function that maps each node of τ to an element
in L, and δ : τ × τ → M is an edge labelling function that maps each edge (x, xn) of
τ to an element in M . Then, every path ρ = , n0, n0n1, . . . of τ generates a sequence
Γ(ρ) = λ().δ(, n0).λ(n0).δ(n0, n0n1).λ(n0n1). . . . of alternating labels from L and M .
Informally, if L and M correspond to the sets of states S and actions Act of a pd-
process A, then we can use an 〈S,Act〉-labeled tree to characterize the semantics of
A. In particular, the branches of the tree (once mapped with the labeling functions)
represent execution paths, and the tree hierarchy reﬂects the branching structures of the
process.
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Figure 3.3: Examples of execution trees of the worlds W256 and W2.
Deﬁnition 3.2 (Execution trees). Let A = (S, s0, D,Act,G,Δ, F, AP,L) be a pd-
process. An execution tree of A in a world W ∈ W(D) is a 〈S,Act〉-labeled tree
T = (τ, λ, δ) such that:
(i) λ() = s0 and for every leaf x ∈ τ we have λ(x) ∈ F , and
(ii) for each edge (x, xn) of τ , there exists a guard g ∈ G such that (λ(x), δ(x, xn), g, λ(xn)) ∈
Δ and g(W ) = True.
We denote by Tr(A,W ) the set of execution trees of A in the world W .
The set of execution trees of a given pd-process may be inﬁnite. Continuing with the
example, due to the presence of a loop Premium Modiﬁcation at the state Approval
processing of the process PremCalc, the set Tr(PremCalc,W256) of its execution trees in
the world W256 is inﬁnite. For example, the execution tree T3 of Figure 3.3 includes a
one time execution of this loop. Starting from T3, an inﬁnite number of execution trees
may be constructed by increasing the number of times this loop is executed.
Deﬁnition 3.3 (Possible execution trees). Let A = (S, s0, D,Act,G,Δ, F, AP,L) be a
pd-process.
A 〈S,Act〉-labelled tree T = (τ, λ, δ) is a possible execution tree of A iﬀ ∃W ∈ W(D)
and ∃λ′ : τ → S such that T ′ = (τ, λ′, δ) ∈ Tr(A,W ).
The probability of a possible execution tree T of A is: Pr(T,A) =
∑
W∈W(D)
T ′∈Tr(A,W )
Pr(W ).
Chapter 3. Model description 30
We denote by Tr(A) the set of all possible execution trees of a process A.
A possible execution tree T is simply an execution tree augmented with the probability
of occurrence of T . Note that two execution trees are considered equal if they diﬀer
only w.r.t. the labels of their states (e.g., T is equal to T ′ in deﬁnition 3.3). Hence, a
probability of a possible execution tree T is calculated as the sum of the probabilities
of the possible worlds to which T , modulo renaming of states, belongs. As an example,
probabilities of the execution trees T1 and T2 of PremCalc depicted at Figure 3.3 are:
Pr(T1,PremCalc) = 24% and Pr(T2,PremCalc) = 80%.
Possible execution trees show the intricate relations between probabilities of transitions
and branching choices. Continuing with the example, the possible execution trees T1,
T2 and T3 reveal that when the PremCalc process is at the state Starting we may have
the following situations:
(i) the only possible choice is to execute the transition RapidEvaluation (tree T1 with a
probability Pr(T1,PremCalc) = 24%), or (ii) the only possible choice is to execute the
transition NormalRiskEvaluation (tree T2 with a probability Pr(T2,PremCalc) = 80%),
or (iii) there is a choice to execute either transition NormalRiskEvaluation or transition
RapidEvaluation (tree T3 with a probability Pr(T3,PremCalc) = 16%). Such a complex
correlation between probabilities of transitions and branching choices makes any struc-
tural analysis of pd-processes a diﬃcult task. As explained below, one consequence is
that it is not straightforward to provide a simple deﬁnition of simulation based only on
the structures of the processes. It is worth noting that although the trees T1 and T2
are both sub-trees of T3, they both have a probability greater than the one of T3. This
is because T1 and T2 belong to more possible worlds than T3. This general property,
which states that the probability of a tree T is always less or equal to the probability of
its sub-trees, will be exploited later to devise a simulation algorithm for pd-processes.
3.2 World-partition automata
For the reason of simulation relation test and model checking, we describe below a reﬁne-
ment of a pd-process structure into a set of automata, called world-partition automata,
that can be used to structurally characterize simulation and facilitate the veriﬁcation
method of pd-processes. We recall that for a set G, the set 2G denotes the power set of
G (i.e., the set of all subsets of G).
Let A = (S, s0, D,Act,G,Δ, F, AP,L) be a pd-process with G = {q1, . . . , qn} a set of
boolean queries used as guards of transitions in A. Let PG be a set of boolean queries
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Process Partitions Associated query P. worlds Probability
PremCalc
P1 qP1 = ¬q1 ∧ q2 ∧ ¬q3 ∧ ¬q4 ∧ q5 ∧ q6 {W2, ...} 6.048%
P2 qP2 = q1 ∧ q2 ∧ ¬q3 ∧ q4 ∧ q5 ∧ ¬q6 {W3, ...} 2.592%
P3 qP3 = ¬q1 ∧ q2 ∧ ¬q3 ∧ q4 ∧ q5 ∧ q6 {W4, ...} 6.048%
. . . . . . . . .
NormCalc
P ′1 qP ′1 = q
′
1 ∧ q′2 {W4, ...} 16%
P ′2 qP ′2 = q
′
1 ∧ ¬q′2 {W5, ...} 34%
P ′3 qP ′3 = ¬q′1 ∧ q′2 {W2, ...} 16%
P ′4 qP ′4 = ¬q1 ∧ ¬q2 {W6, ...} 34%
Table 3.1: Example partitions
obtained as follows:
(i) ∀P ∈ 2G, qP := (
∧
q∈P
q) ∧ ( ∧
q′ /∈P
¬q′), and
(ii) PG = {qP | P ∈ 2G}.
Note that, the set PG forms a partition of the possible worlds of the database D in the
sense given by the following lemma.
Lemma 3.4. Let A = (S, s0, D,Act,G,Δ, F, AP,L) and let PG be the set of guards
constructed as explained above. Then, ∀W ∈ W(D), there exists a unique qP ∈ PG such
that qP (W ) = true.
The proof of this lemma is straightforward since, by construction of PG, ∀W ∈ W(D) we
have: (i)
∨
qP∈PG
qP (W ) = true, and (ii) ∀qpi, qpj ∈ PG, with i = j, then qpi(W )∧qpj(W ) =
false. Hence, each boolean query qP ∈ PG identiﬁes a unique subset of W(D) (i.e., the
set {W ∈ W(D) | qP (W ) = true}).
In the sequel, we use the term partition qP to refer to the subset of W(D) identiﬁed by
qP . Table 3.1 shows examples of partitions related to the set of guards of the processes
PremCalc and NormCalc. For each partition, an associated probability is computed (c.f.,
last column in Table 3.1) using a probabilistic database management system. Also note
that it may happen that a probability associated to a given partition is equal to zero.
In this case, the corresponding query is removed from the set PG.
We introduce below the notion of world-partition automata as a mean to split the be-
haviour described by a given pd-process w.r.t. the possible worlds of the underlying
probabilistic database. More precisely, the goal is to split the set of possible execution
trees of a pd-process A into subsets of trees each of which is described by a distinct
unguarded automaton.
Deﬁnition 3.5 (World-partition automata). Let A = (S, s0, D,Act,G,Δ, F, AP,L) be
a pd-process and let PG = {qP1 , . . . , qPn} deﬁned as previously. A world-partition au-
tomata of A using PG is a set of automata APG = {AP1 , . . . , APn}, where, ∀qPi ∈ PG, a
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corresponding automaton APi = (S, s0, DPi , Act,GPi ,ΔPi , F, AP,L) is constructed from
A as follows:
(i) the components S, s0, Act, and F , remain unchanged,
(ii) the set of guards is: GPi = {true} and the database is DPi = ∅,
(iii) the set of transitions is: ΔPi = {(s, a, true, s′) | (s, a, g, s′) ∈ Δ and g ∈ Pi}.
The probability function Pr is extended to world-partition automaton as follows: ∀AP ∈
APG , then Pr(AP ) =
∑
W∈W(D)
qP (W )=true
Pr(W )
Hence, an automaton APi ∈ APG is simply a copy of the process A from which are
removed the transitions having a guard g satisfying the condition Pr(g ∧ qPi) = 0 (or
equivalently, ∀W ∈ W(D) | g ∧ qPi(W ) = false)1. Note that such a test can be achieved
easily by checking whether g ∈ Pi (since we have: Pr(g∧qPi) = 0 iﬀ g /∈ Pi). From item
(ii) of this deﬁnition, each automaton APi ∈ APG is an unguarded automaton (i.e., all
its guards are set to true).
Figure 3.4(a) shows the world-partition automata of the process NormCalc while the
Figure 3.4(c) shows two automata from the world-partition automata of the process
PremCalc.
Figure 3.4: Example of world-partition automata.
Intuitively, a world-partition automaton AP ∈ APG describes the behaviour of A in all
the possible worlds belonging to the partition qP . The following lemma makes explicit
1Indeed, APi must then be cleaned by removing states that do not belong to a direct path from the
initial state to a ﬁnal state. Such a cleaning can be achieved in linear time using algorithms such as
breadth ﬁrst search.
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the connection between the behaviour of a pd-process A and the behaviours described
by its world-partition automata.
Lemma 3.6. Let A = (S, s0, D,Act,G,Δ, F, AP,L) be a pd-process and let APG its set
of world-partition automata. Then:
(i) let W ∈ W(D) be a possible world of D that belongs to a partition qP ∈ APG. Then,
T is an execution tree of A in the world W iﬀ T ∈ Tr(AP ).
(ii) T ∈ Tr(A) with Pr(T,A) > 0 iﬀ ∃{APi1 , . . . , APil} ⊆ APG such that: T ∈ Tr(APij ),
∀ij ∈ {i1, . . . , il}, and Pr(T,A) =
∑
ij∈{i1,...,il}
Pr(APij )
Proof. • (i) (⇒) Let W ∈ W(D) and qP ∈ APG | qP (W ) = true and let T =
(τ, λ, δ) ∈ Tr(A,W ).
By deﬁnition 3.2, ∀(x, xn) ∈ τ , ∃g ∈ G such that (λ(x), δ(x, xn), g, λ(xn)) ∈ Δ
and g(W ) = True. Let GT be the set containing such guards g.
From lemma 3.4,we have GT ⊆ P
Hence, T ∈ Tr(AP ,W ), by construction of AP .
• (i)(⇐) Straightforward.
• (ii)(⇒) Assume T ∈ Tree(A) with Pr(T,A) > 0. Hence, from deﬁnition 3.3, there
exists {Wi1 , . . . ,Wil} ⊆ W(D) | T ∈ Tr(A,Wij ) and Pr(T,A) =
∑
ij∈{i1,...,il}
Pr(Wij ).
From (1), we can derive that ∃{APi1 , . . . , APil} ⊆ APG such that T ∈ Tr(APij ),
∀ij ∈ {i1, . . . , il}, and Pr(T,A) =
∑
ij∈{i1,...,il}
Pr(APij ).
• (ii)(⇐) Assume that ∃{APi1 , . . . , APil} ⊆ APG such that: T ∈ Tr(APij ), ∀ij ∈
{i1, . . . , il}. Hence, T ∈ Tr(A) and Pr(T,A) > 0 (from (1) and deﬁnition 3.3).
Chapter 4
Veriﬁcation methods
This chapter mainly focuses on the method of testing simulation relation and model
checking in the context of pd-processes. In the ﬁrst section, with the help of world
partition automata introduced in the previous chapter, an algorithm of testing simulation
relation of pd-processes is given and the complexity is in 2-EXPTIME. In the second
part, P-LTL and P-CTL model checking algorithms over pd-processes are studied as
well as their complexity.
4.1 Simulation preorder
The notion of simulation is used in the literature to compare ﬁnite state machine with
respect to their branching structures [42]. Usually simulation is deﬁned as a relation
between the states of the considered processes. In the case of pd-processes, and due to the
tight connection between possible execution trees and possible worlds of a probabilistic
database, it is not easy to provide such a structural deﬁnition (i.e., as a general relation
between states). This is because, whether or not a given state s is simulated by another
state s′ depends on the considered possible world. As a consequence, instead of a
structural deﬁnition, we provide below a deﬁnition of simulation based on the semantics
of pd-processes.
Deﬁnition 4.1 (Simulation relation between pd-processes). LetA = (S, s0, D,Act,G,Δ,
F ) and A′ = (S′, s′0, D′, Act′, G′,Δ′, F ′) be two pd-processes. Then, A is simulated by A′,
noted A  A′, iﬀ: ∀T = (τ, λ, δ) ∈ Tr(A), ∃λ′ : τ → S′ such that T ′ = (τ, λ′, δ) ∈ Tr(A′),
and Pr(T,A) ≤ Pr(T ′, A′).
Hence, semantics of simulation is deﬁned as a containment between the sets of possi-
ble execution trees of the considered pd-processes. According to this deﬁnition, when
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comparing execution trees of two processes, the labels of the activities are taken into ac-
count while names of the states are meaningless. Hence, if a process A is simulated by a
process A′, then every possible execution tree of A is also a possible execution tree of A′
(modulo renaming of states) with an equal or higher probability. It is worth noting that
the provided deﬁnition of simulation is conservative in the sense that when it is applied
to pd-processes with non-probabilistic databases (i.e., having probability of each tuple
equal to 1), it matches non-probabilistic simulation on conventional LTSs. If we come
back to the example of NormCalc and PremCalc, there are numerous situations where
it is interesting to identify whether the process NormCalc is a reﬁnement of the process
PremCalc w.r.t. to the simulation preorder. Unfortunately, deﬁnition 4.1 is semantic
(i.e., it deﬁnes the meaning of simulation as a relation between possible execution trees)
and not structural (i.e., does not deﬁne a relation between states and transitions of the
processes). Therefore, there is no direct way to derive a simulation algorithm from such
a deﬁnition (since testing inclusion between potentially inﬁnite sets of possible execution
trees is not feasible). As a consequence, we can use the notion of partition automata
to decompose a pd-process into a set of (unguarded) automata that can be analyzed
separately to structurally characterize simulation relation between pd-processes.
While a world-partition automata APG enables to split an original process A into a
set of automata that describe all the possible execution trees of A, it is still not easy
to reason separately on elements of APG to test simulation. This is due to the fact
that a probability of a possible tree T of A may be obtained from a subset of APG
(and not only from a unique element of APG) (c.f., lemma 3.6). Such problematic
execution trees belong to intersections of elements of APG . Figure 3.4(b) shows the (non-
empty) automata obtained from intersections between subsets of the world-partition
automata of the process NormCalc1. Then it is easy to see that execution trees of
the automaton AP ′1  AP ′2 are possible execution trees of the process NormCalc with
a probability equal to Pr(AP ′1) + Pr(AP ′2). Therefore, to characterize precisely the
probabilities of every possible execution tree by a unique automata, there is a need to
compute the closure of world-partition automata w.r.t. the intersection operation. In
the example, the world-partition automata of NormCalc needs to be augmented with
the automata of Figure 3.4(b) in order to obtain the closure of the world-partition
automata of NormCalc w.r.t. intersection operation. The closure of world-partition
automata, called closure-automata, is formally deﬁned below after the introduction of
some needed notation. Let A = (S, s0, D,Act,G,Δ, F, AP,L) be a pd-process and let
APG its corresponding world-partition automata. For a set ψ ∈ 2APG (i.e., a subset of
APG), we deﬁne Aψ :=

AP∈ψ
AP . Therefore, Aψ is an unguarded automata which
describes the behavior common to all the automata of the set ψ.
1The symbol  denotes conventional intersection between LTSs.
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Deﬁnition 4.2. (closure-automata) Let A = (S, s0, D,Act,G,Δ, F, AP,L) a pd-
process and let APG its corresponding world-partition automata. The closure of the
world-partition automata of A is given by the set CL(APG) = {Aψ | ψ ∈ 2APG},
where each transition system Aψ ∈ CL(A) is associated with a probability distribution
Pr(Aψ) =
∑
AP∈ψ
Pr(AP ).
As an example, the set CL(NormCalc), corresponding to the closure of world-partition
automata of the process NormCalc, is made of the automata of Figures 3.4(a) and (b)
and their associated probabilities (shown in the ﬁgures).
Simulation test algorithm
This part studies the algorithm of testing simulation relation of pd-processes. As a main
technical result of this chapter, the next theorem provides a structural characterization
of the simulation relation between two pd-processes.
Theorem 4.3. Let A and B be two pd-processes. Let CL(APG) be the closure-automata
of A and let BPG′ be the world-partition automata of B. Then:
A  B iﬀ ∀Aψ ∈ CL(APG), Pr(Aψ) ≤
∑
BP ′∈BPG′
AψBP ′
Pr(BP ′)
sketch. (⇐) Assume that ∀Aψ ∈ CL(APG), we have Pr(Aψ) ≤
∑
BP ′∈BPG′
AψBP ′
Pr(BP ′) (i).
Let T = (τ, λ, δ) ∈ Tr(A) with Pr(T,A) > 0. By lemma 3.6, ∃{APi1 , . . . , APil} ⊆
APG such that: T ∈ Tr(APij ), ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , l}, and Pr(T,A) =
∑
ij∈{i1,...,il}
Pr(APij ).
Let Aψ := APi1  . . .APil . From assumption (i), we derive: ∃{BP ′i1 , . . . , BP ′ik} ⊆
BP ′G such that Aψ  BP ′ij , j ∈ [1, k], and Pr(ψ) ≤
∑
j∈[1,k]
Pr(BP ′ij
). Hence,
∀BP ′ij , with j ∈ [1, k], ∃λ
′ : τ → S′ such that T ′ = (τ, λ′, δ) ∈ Tr(BP ′ij ). From
lemma 3.6, T ′ ∈ Tr(B) and Pr(T ′, B) ≥ ∑
j∈[1,k]
Pr(BP ′ij
) ≥ Pr(T,A). Hence,
A  B (by deﬁnition 4.1).
(⇒) Assume that A  B and ∃Aψ ∈ CL(APG) such that
Pr(Aψ) ≥
∑
BP ′∈BPG′
AψBP ′
Pr(BP ′).
In this case, the maximal execution tree of Aψ does not have any corresponding
tree in B with enough probability.
Hence, A  B (which contradict the assumption)
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Continuing with the example, checking whether the pd-process NormCalc is simulated by
PremCalc can be achieved by checking whether for each automatonAψ in CL(NormCalc),
there is a subset of automata in the world-partition automata of PremCalc each of wich
simulates Aψ and having a sum of probabilities greater or equal to the probability
of Aψ . We recall that, using the automata depicted at Figure 3.4, the closure of
world-automata of NormCalc is CL(NormCalc) = {AP ′1 , AP ′2 , AP ′3 , AP ′1 AP ′2 , AP ′1 AP ′3} .
Consider the case of the automaton AP ′1 of this set. Using any state of the art simulation
algorithm on unguarded LTSs, one can check that this automaton is respectively simu-
lated by the automaton AP1 and by the automaton AP2 of Figure 3.4(c). In fact, AP1 and
AP2 are just two examples of a family of automata from the world-partition automata of
PremCalc that simulates AP ′1 . Indeed, any automaton of the world-partition automata
of PremCalc that belongs to a partition satisfying the guards q2 and q5 of, respectively,
transitions NormalRiskEvaluation and ExpressEvaluation of PremCalc simulates AP ′1 . The
total number of such partitions is 24 with the sum of the associated probabilities equal
to 48% (which is greater than Pr(AP ′1)). Similar reasoning can be extended to all other
elements of CL(NormCalc) to show that conditions of theorem 4.3 are satisﬁed and hence
NormCalc  PremCalc.
Complexity analysis. Let A = (S, s0, DA, Act,G,Δ, F ) be a pd-process. We use |X| to
denote the cardinality of a set X. We extend this notation to pd-processes and we write
|A| to denote the size of the process A deﬁned in terms of its total number of guards,
transitions and states (i.e., |A| = |S| + |Δ| + |G|). We use also the notation |DA| to
denote the size of the probabilistic database used by A deﬁned in terms of total number
of tuples in D. We study the complexity of the problem of checking simulation between
two pd-processes A and B w.r.t. two dimensions: (i) expression complexity, which as-
sumes that |DA|+ |DB| is ﬁxed while |A|+ |B| is variable, and (ii) data complexity, which
assumes that |A|+ |B| is ﬁxed while |DA|+ |DB| is variable.
Theorem 4.4. Let A and B be two pd-processes. The problem of checking whether
A  B is:
(i) in O(f(|D|)) in data complexity, where f(|D|) is the data-complexity of computing
the probabilities of a boolean query on a probabilistic database D,
(ii) exptime-hard w.r.t. the expression complexity,
(iii) can be solved in 2-exptime w.r.t. |A|+ |B|.
Therefore, checking simulation between pd-processes is intractable w.r.t. the size of the
LTSs while, interestingly, it does not introduce additional overhead w.r.t. to probabilistic
query evaluation in data-complexity. We refer to [8] for detailed results regarding the
complexity of this latter problem (i.e., complexity of function f(|D|)) in the context of
disjoint-independent databases. This result is encouraging because data-complexity is
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the most signiﬁcant factor in our context. Indeed, the size of the database of a pd-
process can be expected to be several order of magnitude higher than the size of its
LTS.
Proof. of theorem 4.4. We give the proofs in the following order: (iii), (i) and (ii). Let
A = (S, s0, DA, Act,G,Δ, F ) and B = (S
′, s′0, DB, Act′, G′,Δ′, F ′) be two pd-processes.
Proof of (iii) According to theorem 4.3, checking whether A  B, can be achieved in
three steps:
1. Computing world-partition automata of APG and BP ′G . The size of APG is bounded
by 2|G| and, from deﬁnition 3.5, one can derive that each automata in APG has a
size bounded by |A| and can be constructed: (i) in time linear in |A|, and (ii) by
evaluating one probabilistic query q. A similar reasoning applies for BP ′G .
2. Computing the closure CL(APG) of the world-partition automata of A. The size
of CL(APG) is bounded by 2
|APG | ≤ 22|G| . The size of each automata of CL(APG)
is bounded by 2(log(|A|)∗2|G|) (corresponding to the largest intersection of elements
of APG whose size is bounded by |A|2
|G|
). Hence, computing the closure CL(APG)
is bounded by 22
|G| × 2(log(|A|)∗2|G|) = 22|G|∗(log(|A|+1)).
3. Checking whether condition of theorem 4.3 is satisﬁed which amounts mainly to
testing simulation between pairs in CL(APG)×BP ′G , a set bounded by 22
|G| × 2|G|.
Due to the size of automata in CL(APG) and BP ′G , the simulation test is in O(2
2|G|).
Hence, this step can be achieved in O(22
|G|
).
Therefore, if we omit the cost of evaluating probabilistic queries, checking whether A  B
can be achieved in 2-exptime in |A|+ |B|.
Proof of (i) From proof of (iii), step 2, the number of queries to be evaluated over the
probabilistic database is bounded by 2|G|+|G′| (computation of APG and BP ′G). Hence,
assuming |A| + |B| to be a constant enables to check whether A  B with a data-
complexity that matches the complexity of probabilistic query evaluation.
Proof of (ii)We give now the proof of hardness. We show that checking whether A  B
is exptime-hard, using a reduction from the following problem:
Input: P1, P2, ...Pn, P , a set of (unguarded) automata.
Problem: does P1 × . . .× Pn  P?
This problem is known to be exptime-hard even when the Pis automata have disjoint
alphabets [43]. We ﬁrst reformulate this problem using intersection instead of shuﬄe
then we present the reduction to pd-processes simulation.
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Let Pi = (SPi , s
i
0, ActPi ,ΔPi , FPi), for i ∈ [1, n], and P = (SP , sP0 , ActP ,ΔP , FP ). We
assume that ActPi ∩ActPj = ∅, ∀i, j ∈ [1, n] with i = j.
For each Pi = (SPi , s
Pi
0 , ActPi ,ΔPi , FPi), with i ∈ [1, n], we construct an automata
P˜i = (S˜Pi , s˜
Pi
0 , A˜ctPi , Δ˜Pi , F˜Pi) as follows:
• S˜Pi = SPi , s˜Pi0 = sPi0 and F˜Pi = FPi ,
• A˜ctPi =
n⋃
i=1
ActPi ,
• Δ˜Pi = ΔPi ∪ {(s, a, s) | s ∈ S˜Pi and a ∈ ˜ActPi \ActPi}
The following lemma extends to simulation equivalence a result already known in the
case of language equivalence.
Lemma 4.5. Let Pi and P˜i, with i ∈ [1, n], be two sets of automata deﬁned as described
above. Then: P1 × . . .× Pn  P˜1  . . .  P˜n and P˜1  . . .  P˜n  P1 × . . .× Pn
Proof. If P1 × . . . × Pn is denoted as Prods and P˜1  . . .  P˜n is denoted as Inters, the
lemma 4.5 could be proved as follows:
We shall show that for any state (sP1i1 , s
P2
i2
, . . . , sPnin ) of Prods and there exists a state
(s˜P1i1 , s˜
P2
i2
, . . . , s˜Pnin ) of Inters such that (s
P1
i1
, sP2i2 , . . . , s
Pn
in
)  (s˜
P1
i1
, s˜P2i2 , . . . , s˜
Pn
in
).
(⇒) For a transition relation from the state of Prods:
{((sP1i1 , . . . , sPiii , . . . , sPnin ), a, (sP1i1 , . . . , sPiii+1 , . . . , sPnin ))|(sii , a, sii+1) ∈ ΔPi}.
From the construction of Inters, we could ﬁnd that the corresponding automata of
Pi is P˜i such that (s˜ii , a, s˜ii+1) ∈ Δ˜Pi
Because of the pairwise disjoint alphabet, for other automaton Pj , j = i, (s˜i, a, s˜ii+1) /∈
Δ˜Pj and hence (s˜ii , a, s˜ii) ∈ Δ˜Pj
As a result, there is always a corresponding transition relation
{((s˜P1i1 , . . . , s˜Piii , . . . , s˜Pnin ), a, (s˜P1i1 , . . . , s˜Piii+1 , . . . , s˜Pnin ))|(s˜ii , a, s˜ii+1) ∈ Δ˜Pi}.
By induction, we could get that Prods  Inters if recursively considering all the
outgoing transitions from each pair of states.
(⇐) Similar to (⇒).
Chapter 4. Veriﬁcation methods 40
As a direct consequence of this lemma, the problem of checking whether P˜1. . .P˜n  P
is exptime-hard. We reduce this latter problem to a problem of checking simulation
between two pd-processes PA and PB. The construction of PA and PB is described
below.
Construction of PA and PB.
For each automaton P˜i = (S˜Pi , s˜
Pi
0 , A˜ctPi , Δ˜Pi , F˜Pi) we construct a pd-process Pˆi =
(SˆPAi , sˆ
Pi
0 , AˆctPi , D, GˆPi , ΔˆPi , FˆPi) such that:
• SˆPi = S˜Pi ,sˆPi0 = s˜Pi0 , FˆPi = F˜Pi and AˆctPi = A˜ctPi ;
• D is the probabilistic database depicted at Table 4.1. It is deﬁned over a schema
made of a unary relation Test which contains the tuples tgA , tgB , t1, . . . tn. The
probabilities of these tuples are computed as follows:
– ∀i ∈ [1, n], xi = v, for any value v s.t. 22n−1 < v < 1, (w.l.o.g., we assume
n ≥ 2).
– xgA takes any value satisfying 0 < xgA <
2
(2n−1)v .
– xgB = (n− 12) ∗ v ∗ xgA .
• GˆPi = {gA, gi} is the set of guards. The guards gA and gi are deﬁned as follows:
gA() : −Test(‘g′A)
gi() :- ¬Test(‘g′1), . . . ,¬Test(‘g′i−1),Test(‘g′i),¬Test(‘g′i+1), . . . ,¬Test(‘g′n)
• ΔˆPi = {(sj , a, gi, sj) | ∃(sj , a, sj) ∈ ΔPi and a ∈ A˜ctPi} ∪ {(sj , a, gA, sj) |
∃(sj , a, sj) ∈ ΔPi and a ∈
n⋃
j=1
j =i
A˜ctPj}
Construction of PA. We merge together the Pˆis pd-processes to form the pd-process
PA = (SPA , s
PA
0 , ActPA , D,GPA ,ΔPA , FPa) deﬁned as follows:
• sPA0 is a new state used as the initial state of PA.
• SPA = {sPA0 } ∪
n⋃
i=1
SˆPAi .
• ActPA = {anew} ∪
n⋃
i=1
AˆctPi , where anew is a new action.
• GPA =
n⋃
i=1
GˆPi .
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Relation Test
Attrib Pr
tgA gA xgA
tgB gB xgB
t1 g1 x1
t2 g2 x2
. . . . . .
tn gn xn
Table 4.1: The probabilistic database D
• ΔPA = {(sPA0 , anew, true, sˆPi0 ), for i ∈ [1, n]} ∪
n⋃
i=1
ΔˆPi .
• FPi =
n⋃
i=1
FˆPi .
Construction of PB. Given an automaton P = (SP , s
P
0 , ActP ,ΔP , FP ), we construct
a pd-process PB = (SPB , s
PB
0 , ActPB , D,GPB ,ΔPB , FPB ) as follows.
• sPB0 is a new state used as the initial state of PB.
• SPB = {sPB0 } ∪ SP .
• ActPB = {anew} ∪ActP ∪
n⋃
i=1
ActPi .
• GPB = {gb}
• ΔPB = {(sPB0 , anew, true, sP0 )}∪{(s, a, true, s′) | (s, a, s′) ∈ ΔP }∪{(sPB0 , a, gb, sPB0 ) |
a ∈ {anew} ∪
n⋃
i=1
ActPi}
• FPB = FP ∪ {sPB0 }.
• D is the same probabilistic database used for PA.
Observe that, by construction, |PA| is linear in the size of Pis while |PB| is linear in the
sizes of the Pis and P .
Lemma 4.6. Let P , Pi, with i ∈ [1, n], a set of automata, the Pis having disjoint
alphabets. Let PA and PB the corresponding pd-processes constructed as described above.
Then: P˜1  . . .  P˜n  P iﬀ PA  PB
Proof. of lemma 4.6. We make ﬁrst the following observations.
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• Since GPB = {gb}, the world-partition automata of PB contains only the following
two automata:
– Pˆ representing the partition associated with the guard ¬gb. P˜ corresponds
to the automata P augmented with a new initial state sPB0 and a transition
labelled anew from s
PB
0 to the initial state of P .
– an automaton, noted P u, representing the partition associated with the guard
gb. Note that the automata P
u is universal since it contains in its initial
state sPB0 , which is also a ﬁnal state, a loop labelled with alphabet from
{anew} ∪
n⋃
i=1
ActPi . Hence, P
u simulates any automaton from the world-
partition automata of PA.
• Note that the guards gi in PA are pairwise disjoint. Hence, the world-partition
automata of PA contains two subsets:
– A set, noted PosA, of n automata representing partitions where ga appears
positively.
– A set, noted NegA, of n automata representing partitions in which the guard
ga appears negatively.
Let us now prove the two directions of lemma 4.6.
(⇒) Assume that P˜1  . . .  P˜n  P
⇒ Pˆ1  . . .  Pˆn  Pˆ (by construction of Pˆ and the Pˆis),
⇒ ∀T ∈ NegA, T  Pˆ ,
⇒ ∀T ∈ NegA, T 

Pˆj∈X
X⊆PosA∪NegA
Pˆj  Pˆ ,
Note that max
T∈CL(PAPG )
(Prob(T )) = Prob(gA) + Prob(¬gA) = 1
⇒ max
T∈CL(PAPG )
(Prob(T )) ≤ Prob(Pˆ ) + Prob(P u)
⇒ PA  PB
(⇐) Assume that PA  PB
⇒ Pˆ1  . . .  Pˆn  Pˆ . This is because P u alone is not enough to simulate Pˆ1  . . .  Pˆn
since Pr(P u) = xgB = (n− 12) ∗ v ∗ xgA ≤ n ∗ v ∗ xgA = Pr(Pˆ1  . . .  Pˆn).
⇒ P˜1  . . .  P˜n  P
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4.2 Model checking
This section proposes the method to do model checking in the context of pd-processes.
Because pd-process is a probabilistic transition system, LTL or P-LTL captures the
parallel meaning as well as CTL or P-CTL. In this thesis, we only consider P-LTL
and P-CTL model checking. The ﬁrst part is about the discussion of algorithm and
complexity of the P-LTL model checking over pd-processes. The second part is denoted
to P-CTL algorithms and complexity.
To make the description clear, this chapter uses the same example as the previous
chapters. But model checking focuses on the proposition of every state. Figure 4.1
illustrates the atomic propositions and their distribution for every state.
Figure 4.1: The proposition assignment for every state.
4.2.1 P-LTL Model Checking on Pd-processes
Because pd-process is a probabilistic transition system, linear temporal properties are
described in the fashion of checking probability and LTL formulae. As a result, linear
temporal properties are always related to probabilistic model checking. In this thesis,
we don’t distinguish LTL or P-LTL model checking in the context of pd-processes. So
checking linear temporal properties over pd-processes is named as P-LTL model checking
on pd-processes. By reusing the syntax of P-LTL and following the traditional P-LTL
model checking method, the method of P-LTL model checking on pd-processes is as
follows. Let A = (S, s0, D,Act,G,Δ, F, AP,L) be a pd-process and let W ∈ W(D), we
denote Aw = (S, s0, DW , Act,G,Δ, F, AP,L) be an automaton associated with world
W . DW can be seen as a probabilistic database derived from W where the probability
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of each tuple in W is 1. The deﬁnition of P-LTL model checking on Pd-processes is as
follows:
Deﬁnition 4.7 (P-LTL Model Checking on Pd-processes). For a given pd-process A =
(S, s0, D,Act,G,Δ, F, AP,L) and a P-LTL formula ϕ, A ∼pr ϕ iﬀ
∑
AWiϕ
Wi∈W(D)
Pr(AWi) ∼
pr (∼ means =, <,>,,).
Because the paths of pd-processes are probabilistic, the P-LTL model checking on pd-
processes cannot directly check the paths of original pd-process. Fortunately, a pd-
process is a set of traditional automata corresponding with the possible worlds of prob-
abilistic database and these automata are adequate through P-LTL model checking
method. As a result, the P-LTL model checking on pd-processes is slightly changed to
check if it is possible to return a ”true” answer satisfying the given probability. Follow-
ing the example in Figure 4.1 and probabilistic database in Table 2.2, we want to check
some properties in this model. First, these properties are described in nature language
as follows:
• Checking if the premium application can be approved and give answers at the end
of approval processes with probability > 0.5.
• Checking if the high risk evaluation can be approved with probability > 0.2.
We interpret these properties to LTL formula. For A = (S, s0, D,Act,G,Δ, F, AP,L),
the properties above can be translated to
1. Pr(A ©ap6 ∧ ♦ap10) > 0.5.
2. Pr(A  ap3 ∧ ♦ap8) > 0.2.
Algorithm 2 depicts the method of P-LTL checking under the context of pd-process
which stands for a ﬁnite set of traditional automata associated with diﬀerent probabilities
represented by a set of partition automata. To do the P-LTL model checking under this
context, we could do it for every partition automaton by following the traditional LTL
model checking methodology. Because of the existence of probability for each partition
automaton, the P-LTL model checking may not be 100% true or false. To accumulate the
probability of ”true”, we introduce a variable P to help us checking the ﬁnal probability
satisfaction.
Proof. For a given pd-process A = (S, s0, D,Act,G,Δ, F, AP,L), if W (Pi) stands for
the possible worlds which could be expressed by guard partition Pi, W (Pi) = {Wi1 ,Wi2
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Algorithm 2 Algorithm of P-LTL model checking on pd-processes
Require:
A pd-process A = (S, s0, D,Act,G,Δ, F, AP,L) and P-LTL formula ϕ over AP ,
checking if A ∼pr ϕ.
Ensure:
1: Construct a Non-deterministic Buchi Automata NBA¬ϕ such that L(NBA¬ϕ) =
Words(¬ϕ) and a variable P to record the probabilities of adequate partition au-
tomata.
2: Generate partition automataAPG forA and for each partition automaton APi ∈ APG ,
construct the product APi ⊗NBA¬ϕ.
3: If there dose not exist any accepted sequence (for example, a path Π) in APi ⊗
NBA¬ϕ, it means the model checking will return ”true” with respect to the partition
automata APi , P+ = Pr(APi).
4: If P ∼ pr, return true, otherwise return false.
5: return True or false .
, ...,Wij} where Wik ∈ W(D), 1  k  j. Then we have {AWi1 , AWi2 , ..., AWij } corre-
sponding with the worlds in W (Pi). Because for any Wik ∈ W (Pi), it can make Pi true.
APi and AWik are equivalent automata and by deﬁnition of world partition automata,
we have Pr(APi) =
∑j
k=1 Pr(AWik ). Meanwhile, by deﬁnition of guard partitions, if
Wik ∈ W (Pi), then Wik /∈ W (Pj) where Pi = Pj . Obviously, for a given P-LTL formula
ϕ, if ∃AWik  ϕ, Wik ∈ W (Pi), then ∀AWim  ϕ,Wim ∈ W (Pi). If
∑
AWiϕ
Wi∈W(D)
Pr(AWi) ∼
pr, there exists a set of world partition automata {APi1 , APi2 , ..., APij } such that Wi ∈
W (Pik), 1  k  j and
∑
APiϕ
Pr(APi) ∼ pr. Therefore, Algorithm 2 and Deﬁnition
4.7 are equivalent.
Continuing checking the formulae of the example above, do LTL model checking for every
partition automaton to check the satisfaction of these two P-LTL formulae. Taking the
ﬁrst one to brieﬂy be studied, taking the partition automata in Fig. 3.4 (c) as an example,
both automata can be satisﬁed by formula 1. Then we could add the probability, it is
easy to see the ﬁnal probability is bigger than 0.5. So formula 1 is satisﬁed. Then we
consider formula 2, in Fig. 3.4 (c), both automata are not satisﬁed by formula 2. When
we check all the partition automata, only the one with guard partitions {g1} can be
satisﬁed, the probability is 8.68%. As a result, formula 2 is not satisﬁed due to the
probability is less than what we need.
Complexity of P-LTL model checking on pd-processes
Theorem 4.8. The complexity of P-LTL model checking on pd-processes is as follows:
(i) in O(f(|D|)) in data complexity, where f(|D|) is the data-complexity of computing
the probabilities of a boolean query on a probabilistic database D,
(ii) EXPTIME-complete w.r.t. the expression complexity,
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Proof. Proof of (ii) From [17], we already know that checking a P-LTL formula can
be achieved in EXPTIME w.r.t expression complexity. According to theorem 4.8, do
P-LTL model checking on pd-process A of P-LTL formula ϕ, can be achieved in several
steps:
• Computing world-partition automata of APG . The size of APG is bounded by
2|G| and, from deﬁnition 3.5, one can derive that each automata in APG has a
size bounded by |A| and can be constructed: (i) in time linear in |A|, and (ii) by
evaluating one probabilistic query q.
• For every world-partition automaton APi , do the traditional LTL model checking.
The complexity of traditional LTL model checking is bounded by |A| ∗ 2|ϕ|.
• To sum up, the P-LTL model checking equals that doing traditional LTL model
checking on every partition automata. Hence, the complexity is O(|A|×2|ϕ|×2|G|).
The hardness is obtained from the veriﬁcation of standard LTL model checking which
is known as EXPTIME-complete. Indeed, such a problem can be easily translated by
letting a pd-process with an empty probabilistic database and setting all the guards to
true.
Proof of (i) From proof of (ii), the number of query to be evaluated over the proba-
bilistic database is bounded by 2|G| (computation of APG). Hence, assuming |A| to be
a constant enables to check LTL properties with a data-complexity that matches the
complexity of probabilistic query evaluation.
4.2.2 P-CTL Model Checking on Pd-processes
At present, the problem is how to achieve P-CTL model checking under the context of
pd-process. If we consider the P-CTL model checking method is a black box function
and assume a pd-process is a set of traditional automata (partition automata) without
guards, the result of model checking for each partition automaton is a set of states
which satisfy the P-CTL formulae. The semantic of traditional P-CTL model checking
is to verify the set of states which satisfy the CTL formulae and also the probability
given by the syntax P∼pr(φ). This probability restricts the probability scope of the
candidate states. So under the context of pd-processes, we can reuse the method of
CTL model checking of pd-processes. That’s because the semantic of pd-processes is
for a given probabilistic database, diﬀerent possible worlds can let corresponding pd-
process represents diﬀerent automata (partition automata). The probability of each
automaton means the probability of the occurrence of the states in this automaton. If
one state exists in several partition automata, that means the occurrence of this states
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in the overall pd-process is the sum of the corresponding automata probabilities. When
we go back to the problem of P-CTL model checking, the syntax P∼pr(φ) restricts the
probability of the states satisfying φ. Under the context of pd-process, if si satisﬁes φ
in a set of partition automata, the probability of si satisfying φ is undoubtedly the sum
of these corresponding partition automata. The deﬁnition of P-CTL model checking on
pd-processes is as follows:
Deﬁnition 4.9 (PCTL Model Checking on Pd-processes). For a given pd-process
A = (S, s0, D,Act,G,Δ, F, AP,L) and a P-CTL formula P∼pr(Φ), the satisfaction set is
Sat(P∼pr(Φ) = {s|s ∈ S, s  Φ, P r(s) ∼ pr}where Pr(s) =
∑
Pr(AWi)|Wi ∈ W(D), s ∈
SAWi and s  Φ under the context of AWi . (∼ means =, <,>,,).
Because P∼pr(φ) is a P-CTL syntax and it can be a part of Φ, under the context of
pd-processes, it is impossible to reuse the traditional P-CTL model checking algorithm,
we could reuse the method of traditional CTL model: checking to build the parse tree
of P-CTL formula and computing the satisfaction set of each node. To compute the
probability and merge the result of child node in the parse tree, there needs a set to
restore the adequate partition automata whose set of states satisfy the P-CTL syntax.
The algorithms for non-probabilistic syntax and probabilistic syntax is as follows:
Algorithm 3 Algorithm of computing satisfaction set of P-CTL syntax:probabilistic
case
Require:
A pd-process A = (S, s0, D,Act,G,Δ, F, AP,L) and P-CTL formula P∼pr(φ) over
AP , ﬁnding Sat(P∼pr(φ)).
Ensure:
1: Generate a set to record the partition automata whose states satisfy the syntax
denoted as SatPA(P∼pr(φ)).
2: Do traditional CTL model checking on every partition automaton APi and if si ∈
SAPi , si  φ under the context of APi , Pr(si)+ = Pr(APi), SatPA(P∼pr(φ)) adds
APi .
3: Finally, checking all the states, if Pr(si) ∼ pr, Sat(P∼pr(φ)) adds si.
4: return Sat(P∼pr(φ)) and SatPA(P∼pr(φ)).
With the help of Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 4, the algorithm to do the P-CTL model
checking can be started from dividing the P-CTL formula in the form of parse tree. Then
we can bottom-up compute the satisfaction set for each node. For the leaf nodes, using
Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 4 compute the satisfaction set of states and the satisfaction
set of partition automata. For the internal node, if non-probabilistic case, intersect
these two sets from its child nodes; else if probabilistic case, intersect these two sets
then check the probability of each state in the satisfaction set of states according to its
occurrence in the satisfaction set of partition automata. Finally, the satisfaction of root
is the answer of model checking. The method is described in Algorithm 5.
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Algorithm 4 Algorithm of computing satisfaction set of P-CTL syntax:non-
probabilistic case
Require:
A pd-process A = (S, s0, D,Act,G,Δ, F, AP,L) and CTL formula φ over AP , ﬁnding
Sat(φ).
Ensure:
1: Generate a set to record the partition automata whose states satisfy the syntax
denoted as SatPA(φ).
2: Do traditional CTL model checking on every partition automaton APi and if
si ∈ SAPi , si  φ under the context of APi , Pr(si)+ = Pr(APi), Sat(φ)) adds
si, SatPA(φ) adds APi .
3: return Sat(φ)) and SatPA(φ).
Algorithm 5 Algorithm of P-CTL model checking on pd-processes
Require:
A pd-process A = (S, s0, D,Act,G,Δ, F, AP,L) and P-CTL formula P∼pr(Φ) over
AP .
Ensure:
1: Build the parse tree of P-CTL formula.
2: Bottom up compute the satisfaction set for each node.
3: For leaf nodes, if the syntax φ is like P∼pr(φ), use Algorithm 3, otherwise, use
Algorithm 4, computing SatPA(φ) and Sat(φ).
4: For internal nodes, if the syntax Φi is a non-probabilistic syntax, intersect the Sat(φ)
for each child nodes to generate Sat(Φi) and do the same to generate SatPA(Φi),
otherwise, not only generating Sat(Φi) and SatPA(Φi) but also checking every state
si ∈ Sat(Φi), if
∑
APi∈SatPA(Φi) Pr(APi)|si ∈ APi dose not satisfy the need of Φi,
Sat(Φi)/si
5: The satisfaction set of root is the answer of P-CTL model checking.
6: return Sat(P∼pr(Φ)).
The proof is similar with the one of P-LTL model checking on pd-processes. For a
given pd-process A and a P-CTL formula Φ, we check every state si whether si  Φ and
Pr(si) ∼ pr. By Deﬁnition 4.9, we check every automaton AWi = (S, s0, DWi , Act,G,Δ,
F,AP, L) corresponding with a given world Wi ∈ W(D), where si ∈ S of AWi . From the
proof of Algorithm 2, we ﬁnd that AWi can be represented as its associated world par-
tition automaton. Then we can transform this problem to check all the world partition
automata. It is obviously that Algorithm 5 and Deﬁnition 4.9 are equivalent.
4.2.2.1 Complexity of P-CTL model checking on pd-processes
Theorem 4.10. The complexity of P-CTL model checking on pd-processes is as follows:
(i) in O(f(|D|)) in data complexity, where f(|D|) is the data-complexity of computing
the probabilities of a boolean query on a probabilistic database D,
(ii) EXPTIME w.r.t. the expression complexity,
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(iii) can be solved in EXPTIME w.r.t. O((|A|) × |Φ|2 × 2|G|) which is capable to be
abbreviated by O(2|G|).
Proof. Proof of (iii) According to theorem 4.10, do P-CTL model checking on pd-
process A of P-CTL formula Φ, can be achieved in several steps:
• Computing world-partition automata of APG . The size of APG is bounded by
2|G| and, from deﬁnition 3.5, one can derive that each automata in APG has a
size bounded by |A| and can be constructed: (i) in time linear in |A|, and (ii) by
evaluating one probabilistic query q.
• For every world-partition automaton APi , do the traditional CTL model checking.
The complexity of traditional CTL model checking is bounded by |A| × |Φ|2.
• To sum up, the P-CTL model checking equals that doing traditional CTL model
checking on every partition automata. Hence, the complexity is O((|A|) × |Φ|2 ×
2|G|). If we abbreviate it, the ﬁnal complexity is O(2|G|).
Proof of (i) From proof of (iii), the number of query to be evaluated over the proba-
bilistic database is bounded by 2|G| (computation of APG). Hence, assuming |A| to be
a constant enables to check LTL properties with a data-complexity that matches the
complexity of probabilistic query evaluation.
Proof of (ii) Because the complexity of computing CTL model checking is in PTIME
but we need to do CTL model checking in every partition automaton, computing par-
tition automata is in EXPTIME. As a result, the total expression complexity is EXP-
TIME.
4.2.2.2 Example
We continue using the example of premium calculation. The property we want to check
is if there exists any state being a risk evaluation letting next state is expert evaluation
and ﬁnally this premium calculation is permitted with probability > 0.3. Translate it
to P-CTL formula: ∃(((ap2 ∧ ©ap7)) ∧ (Pr(♦ap8) > 0.3)). Then we build parse tree
for this P-CTL formula in Figure 4.2. Bottom-up ﬁnding the satisfaction set for every
partition automaton, we take the partition automata in Fig. 3.4 (c) as an example
again. First considering ap2, the satisfaction set for Ap1 is {s2}, for Ap2 is {s2, s3},
within this two partition automata, Sat(ap2) = {s2, s3}, SatAP (ap2) = {Ap1, Ap2},
then we check all the other partition automata, Sat(ap2) = {s1, s2, s3}. Following the
same manner, Sat(©ap7) = {s3}, then we merge the result of these two leaves in the
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parse tree. Sat(ap2 ∧ ©ap7) = {s2}. Noticing that, the set of satisfaction partition
automata is updated as well. Because there are too many result, we don’t show it
here. When we go to ﬁnd the satisfaction set of the leaf Sat(Pr(♦ap8) > 0.3), the
probability of every state satisfying ♦ap8 is considered with respect to the satisfaction
partition automata of Sat(Pr(♦ap8) > 0.3). The answer is that the satisfaction set of
Sat(Pr(♦ap8) > 0.3) is {s0, ..., s5} regardless probability, then considering probability,
the ﬁnal answer is {s0, s1, s2, s3}. Finally, we merge the two satisfaction set Sat(ap2 ∧
©ap7) and Sat(Pr(♦ap8) > 0.3), the result is {s2}. As a result, the satisfaction set of
Sat(∃(((ap2 ∧©ap7)) ∧ (Pr(♦ap8) > 0.3))) = {s2}.
Figure 4.2: The parse tree of P-CTL formula ∃(((ap2 ∧©ap7)) ∧ (Pr(♦ap8) > 0.3)).
Chapter 5
Optimized Algorithms
In this chapter, several optimized algorithms of testing simulation relation on pd-processes
are studied under diﬀerent contexts. Deterministic pd-processes, pseudo-deterministic
pd-processes and strong non-deterministic pd-processes classify pd-processes to several
diﬀerent but related scopes. The third section introduces a special case: the simula-
tion relation test on a compiled approach when only the content of query or database
is altered. Last section reveals the connection between pd-processes with Markov pro-
cesses. As the previous chapters described, pd-process is a non-Markov process but some
special pd-processes which satisfy some properties are equivalent to Markov processes.
We present the notion of independent pd-processes which can be considered as Markov
processes. In the context of independent pd-processes, we have a lower complexity to
do the simulation relation test and model checking.
5.1 Deterministic pd-processes
A formal deﬁnition of deterministic pd-processes is given in Deﬁnition 5.1.
Deﬁnition 5.1 (Deterministic pd-process). Let A = {S, s0, D,Act,Δ, G, F,AP,L} be
a pd-process, A is deterministic iﬀ ∀si ∈ S and ∀(si, ai, gi, si1) ∈ Δ, ∀(si, aj , gj , si2) ∈ Δ
and si1 = si2then ai = aj .
Under the context of Deﬁnition 5.1, we build the partition automata following Theorem
4.3 according to the partitions of guards. The partitions of guards are the power set of
all the guards. To ensure the partition automata cover all the probability, the closure
automata which are the intersections of the partition automata are considered. Lemma
5.3 states the fact that the intersection among partition automata from a deterministic
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pd-process do not create new automaton which diﬀers from the partition automata
involved into this intersection.
Proposition 5.2. For two partition automata {APi , APj} of a deterministic pd-process
A, ∀APi , APj ∈ APG, ∃APk with Pk = Pi ∩ Pj such that Tr(APi APj ) = Tr(APk).
By expressing in terms of execution trees, Proposition 5.2 states a fact that if the result of
intersection between two partition automata of a deterministic pd-process is not empty,
then there exists another partition automaton which coincides with this result. The
proof of this proposition is given below.
Proof. To prove this proposition, let us propose a property of deterministic automata
ﬁrst: because the actions of transition relations outgoing from one state are always
diﬀerent, for the world W (Pk) of a given partition of guard Pk, there exist a set of
execution trees Tr(APk) associated with only one partition automaton APk . If a world
W (Pi) ⊃ W (Pk), W (Pi) associating with a partition automaton APi , ∀Tk ∈ Tr(APk),
∃Ti ∈ Tr(APi) such that Tk is a sub-tree of Ti.
Here is the proof for this property. Because for any path si1
ai1 ,gi1−−−−→ si2
ai2 ,gi2−−−−→ si3 ...
aij ,gij−−−−→
sij+1 in a deterministic pd-process A, we cannot ﬁnd another path through diﬀerent
states assigned with the same sequence of actions and guards. That is to say for two
world partition automata APk and APi of A, if Pk ⊂ Pi, ∀πk ∈ APk then πk ∈ APi .
After this property, we prove this proposition as follows:
• By Deﬁnition 5.1, it is obviously that ∀APi , APj ∈ APG , Pi ∩ Pj = ∅, ∃APk with
Pk = Pi ∩ Pj .
• ⇐, according to the property above, if APiAPj = ∅, Pk = Pi∩Pj then Tr(APk) ⊂
Tr(APi) and Tr(APk) ⊂ Tr(APj ). As a result, we have Tr(APi APj ) ⊇ Tr(APk).
• ⇒, similar with the proof of the property above, if APi  APj = ∅, Pk = Pi ∩ Pj
then for any path si1
ai1 ,gi1−−−−→ si2
ai2 ,gi2−−−−→ si3 ...
aij ,gij−−−−→ sij+1 in A, if its corresponding
path πi = si1
ai1−−→ si2
ai2−−→ si3 ...
aij−−→ sij+1 ∈ APi  APj , then πi ∈ APk . Then we
have: for any tree Ti if Ti ∈ Tr(APi) and Ti ∈ Tr(APj ), Ti ∈ Tr(APk). As a result,
Tr(APi APj ) ⊆ Tr(APk).
Finally ,we have Tr(APi APj ) = Tr(APk).
Lemma 5.3. Let A be a deterministic pd-process, CL(A) \APG = ∅.
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Proof. According to Proposition 5.2, for a set of partition automata {APi1 , APi2 , ..., APin}
of a deterministic pd-process A, if
n
k=1(APik ) = ∅, there exists APj ∈ APG such that
Tr(APj ) =
n
k=1(Tr(APGik
)) and Pj ⊆
⋂n
k=1(Pik) That is to say: all the closure au-
tomata of A can be represented by partition automata APG .
Following Lemma 5.3, under the context of deterministic pd-process, all the closure
automata are contained with partition automata so there is no need to compute closure
automata. However, in order to include the probabilities of related closure automata,
the probabilities of the partition automata need to be recomputed. The computation
is achieved as follows. For each partition automaton APi , it can be seen as a result of
intersecting all the partition automata whose execution trees contain Tr(APi). That
is to say the probability of APi is the sum of the probabilities of all these partition
automata. Because this way of probability computation only consider the positive part
of guards, to distinguish with Pr(APi) deﬁned in the previous chapters, we denote this
kind of probabilities as Pr(APi)
pos. Pr(APi)
pos =
∏
qj∈Pi Pr(qj). Lemma 5.4 states the
reason why we could compute the probability in this way.
Lemma 5.4. Let A be a deterministic pd-process, T ∈ Tr(A) with Pr(T,A) > 0 iﬀ
∃APi ∈ APG |T ∈ Tr(APi) and Pr(T,A) = Pr(APi)pos
Proof. For a given pd-processes A = {S, s0, D,Act,G,Δ, F}, G = {q1, q2, ..., qn}, PG is
the set of guard partitions.
According to Lemma 3.6, T ∈ Tr(A) with Pr(T,A) > 0 iﬀ ∃{APj , . . . , APn} ⊆ APG such
that: T ∈ Tr(APk), ∀k ∈ {j, . . . , n}, and Pr(T,A) =
∑
k∈{j,...,n}
Pr(APk). Assuming Pi
accords to the condition of Lemma 5.4 and Pi = {q1, q2, ..., qi}.
Pr(Pi) =
∏i
j=1 Pr(qj)×
∏n
k=i+1(1− Pr(qk)).
Enumerate all the guard partitions which are the super set of Pi in PG such as Pi+1 =
{q1, q2, ..., qi, qi+1}, Pn = {q1, q2, ..., qi, ..., qn}, etc.
∑
k∈{j,...,n}
Pr(APk) =
∏i
j=1 Pr(qj)×
∏n
k=i+1(1− Pr(qk))+
∏i
j=1 Pr(qj)× Pr(qi+1)×
∏n
k=i+2(1− Pr(qk))+
...+
∏i
j=1 Pr(qj)×
∏n
k=i+1 Pr(qk)=
∏i
j=1 Pr(qj)× (1− Pr(qi+1) + Pr(qi+1))×
∏n
k=i+2(1− Pr(qk))+
...+
∏i
j=1 Pr(qj)×
∏n
k=i+1 Pr(qk)=
This is a recursive formula, and ﬁnally there only
=
∏i
j=1 Pr(qj).
which is
∏
qj∈Pi Pr(qj) = Pr(APi)
pos.
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As a result, comparing the simulation relation between deterministic pd-processes can be
achieved as follows: (i) ﬁrst build the partition automata and compute their probability
Pr(APi)
pos; (ii) ﬁnally, test the simulation relation of the partition automata. Because
the closure automata are not generated, the expression complexity is based on the size
of partition automata which is in EXPTIME.
Pseudo-deterministic pd-process
The deﬁnition of pseudo-deterministic pd-processes is as follows.
Deﬁnition 5.5 (Pseudo-deterministic pd-processes). LetA = {S, s0, D,Act,Δ, G, F,AP
,L} be a pd-process, A is a pseudo-deterministic pd-process iﬀ ∀si ∈ S and ∀(si, ai, gi, si1) ∈
Δ, ∀(si, aj , gj , si2) ∈ Δ such that si1 = si2 , ai = aj and gi = gj .
Pseudo-deterministic pd-processes can be seen as a generalized case of deterministic
pd-processes, because if the guards of transition relations with identical action are the
same, these transition relations always occur in the same partition automaton, therefore
it drops to the scope of determinism.
5.2 Strong non-deterministic pd-processes
In the previous section, the methodology of testing simulation relation between deter-
ministic pd-processes or pseudo-deterministic pd-processes is studied but not all the
pd-processes are pseudo-deterministic so in this section, the strong non-deterministic
case will be described.
Deﬁnition 5.6 (Strong non-deterministic pd-processes). Let A = {S, s0, D,Act,Δ, G,
F,AP,L} be a pd-process, A is a strong non-deterministic pd-process iﬀ ∃si ∈ S and
∃(si, ai, gi, si1) ∈ Δ, ∃(si, aj , gj , si2) ∈ Δ such that si1 = si2 , ai = aj and gi = gj . This
kind of transition relations are called strong non-deterministic transition relations.
As the simulation relation test method described in Theorem 4.3, we have considered
the intersections between all the partition automata so that there exist numeric vol-
umes of abundant operations. The intersection between partition automata is valuable
only when they are composed of strong non-deterministic transition relations. Because
deterministic and pseudo-deterministic cases are captured by partition automata and
their probabilities are recomputed through Pr(APi)
pos. Here we introduce the notion
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of strong non-deterministic guards and deterministic guards as follows. We introduce a
set named strong non-deterministic guards denoted as NDG. The guards which assign
to strong non-deterministic transition relations are recorded in NDG. For other guards
gj /∈ NDG, we call it a pseudo-deterministic guard. The set of pseudo-deterministic
guards is denoted as DG. NDG ∩ DG = ∅ and NDG ∪ DG = G.To compute closure
automata eﬃciently, two kinds of cases are considered as follows:
1. For a partition automaton APi , Pi ⊂ DG, we do not consider it. Because the set
DG does not contain any strong non-deterministic guards which means that there
do not exist transition relations with same actions outgoing from one state. As
a result, the intersections between APi with other partition automata obviously
follow the rule of Lemma 5.3.
2. During the intersections between two partition automata APi and APj , if Pi ⊂ Pj ,
we could ignore them because the result of APi  APj is APi and the probability
of APi has been captured in Pr(APi)
pos.
By ignoring these two cases, the algorithm to build closure automata is as follows:
Algorithm 6 Algorithm of computing closure automata under the context of strong
non-determinism
Require:
One pd-process A = {S, s0, D,Act,G,Δ, F, AP,L}
Ensure:
1: For each state si, check if there exists strong non-deterministic transition relations.
2: If there exists, for all these strong non-deterministic transition relations and corre-
sponding guards {gi1 , gi2 , ..., gij}. Record all these guards into the set NDG.
3: For any guard partition Pi ∈ PG, if Pi ∩NDG = ∅, delete Pi from PG
4: Generate the set of closure automata CL(APG) which are the intersection with
one or many partition automata in APG when the involved guard partitions are
{Pi1 , Pi2 , ..., Pim} satisfying that any two guard partitions are not in this case:
Pij ⊂ Pik . Then compute the probability Pr(CL(APG)).
5: return A set of closure automata.
Lemma 5.7. Let A = {S, s0, D,Act,G,Δ, F, AP,L} be a pd-process and DG is the
set of pseudo-deterministic guards. The complexity of computing closure automata of
pd-processes is in O(2(2
|G|−2|DG|)).
Proof. To prove this lemma, we compute the number of intersection operations to create
closure automata. Because we don’t need to compute the intersection between APi and
APj if Pi ⊆ |DG| and Pj ⊆ |DG| according to Lemma 5.3, the number of candidate
partition automata for closure automata is 2|G| − 2|DG|. Then we compute the number
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of intersections among these partition automata. Obviously, the complexity is the ex-
ponential of the size of involved partition automata. As a result, the complexity is in
O(22
|G|−2|DG|).
From Lemma 5.7, we can ﬁnd a fact that the complexity of computing closure automata
relates to the size of deterministic guards, if |DG| is 0, we get the upper bound of the
complexity of computing closure automata in O(22
|G|); if |DG| = |G|, we don’t need to
compute closure automata.
Figure 5.1 illustrates the process of computing closure automata. Figure 5.1(a) shows
an example of a pd-process with three guards G1, G2, G3. Then we ﬁnd 2 strong non-
deterministic transition relaitons illustrated in Figure 5.1(b). Set NDG and DG are
depicted in Figure 5.1(c). With the help of NDG and DG, we can generate the guard
partitions denoted in Figure 5.1(d). Following Algorithm 6, the intersections between
partition automata are made. Figure 5.1(e) illustrates some of the intersections and the
result of these intersections are demonstrated in Figure 5.1(f).
Figure 5.1: Example of computing closure automata
As a consequence of Lemma 5.7, we reﬁne the complexity of testing simulation relation
on pd-processes below. Let A and B be two pd-processes with GA and GB, the set of
guards of A and B respectively and DGA and DGB, the set of pseudo-deterministic
guards of A and B respectively. Then the simulation relation test between A and B can
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be achieved in O((2|G|+2(2|G|−2|DG|))× 2|G|). Say that if |GA| = |DGA|, the complexity
is in EXPTIME.
5.3 Simulation test algorithm based on a compiled ap-
proach
In this section, we explain the fact that a lower-cost method to analyze a compiled
approach that tests simulation relation between two pd-processes with data changes.
For two given pd-processesA and B, if guards and associated database instances are
changed and we would like to check simulation relation again. The algorithm of previous
section will take plenty of time. Because the structures of partition automata are not
altered regardless probability, there is no need to compute them again. The guard
partitions are not changed since the number of guards and transition relations keep the
original arrange. In this case, we could reuse partition automata which are already
generated and only need to recompute the probability of every partition automata or
closure automata. So to test simulation relation of pd-processes in the context of guards’
queries and database instances changed, Algorithm 7 depicts the ﬁrst step about doing
some pre-computation to generate partition automata and Algorithm 8 describes the
method to test simulation relation of pd-processes when guards’ queries or database
instances are changed with the help of the result of pre-computation in Algorithm 7.
Algorithm 7 The compiled algorithm of simulation test
Require:
Two pd-processes A = {S, s0, D,Act,G,Δ, F, AP,L} and B =
{S′, s′0, D,Act′, G′,Δ′, F ′, AP ′, L′} regardless the content of guards’ queries or
database instances.
Ensure:
1: Generate a set of guard partitions of A denoted as PG.
2: According to PG, build a set of partition automata denoted as APG
3: Generate a set of closure automata denoted as CL(APG).
4: Follow the same manner to generate a set of guard partitions P ′G and partition
automata BP ′G .
5: For each APi , record all the BP ′i ∈ BP ′G such that APi  BP ′i into a mapping table T .
T is a two column one-to-many mapping table where left column records APi ∈ APG
row by row and right column records a set of partition automata ∀BP ′i ∈ BP ′G |APi 
BP ′i for a certain APi in the left row. Do the same stuﬀ for each CL(APi) and record
their mappings in T . In T , if any element in left column maps with an empty set,
the simulation test will return ”False”.
6: return Mapping table T or False.
To illustrate Algorithm 7 clearly, here is an example. Assuming two pd-processes A and
B, partition automata of A are AP1 , AP2 , AP3 and a closure automaton CL(AP1) whose
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Algorithm 8 Algorithm of simulation test based on compiled approach
Require:
Two pd-processA and B, mapping table T generated in Algorithm 7, a new database
D and novel guards’ queries.
Ensure:
1: If the pre-computation in Algorithm 7 doesn’t return false,by using new database
instance and novel guards’ queries, the probability of each guard partition Pi ∈
PG and P
′
i ∈ P ′G should be recomputed as well as their corresponding partition
automata. The probability of closure automata in CL(APG) will be updated by the
sum of their associated partition automata.
2: In table T , for each row, we will check for each element in the left column, if there
exists a partition automaton in the right column of the same row with equal or
higher probability.
3: return True of Flase .
T A B
1 AP1 BP ′1 , BP ′2
2 AP2 BP ′2 , BP ′3
3 AP3 BP ′3
4 CL(AP1) : {AP1 AP2} BP ′2
Table 5.1: Mapping table of A and B
corresponding set of partition automata is {AP1 , AP2}; partition automata of B are
BP ′1 , BP ′2 , BP ′3 . We do some pre-computation and build the mapping table T as follows:
In the ﬁrst row of Table 5.1, left element is AP1 and right element is BP ′1 , BP ′2 . It means
AP1 is simulated by BP ′1 and BP ′2 regardless probability. When guards and database
instances are given, we refer to Algorithm 8 to compute the probability of each partition
automaton and closure automaton of A, partition automaton of B. Then we go back
to table T , we check the preorder relations w.r.t probabilities from left column to right
column for each row. Each time when guards and database instances are changed, we
can reuse the result of pre-computation and only refer to Algorithm 8 to recompute and
check the preorder of the probabilities. Because Algorithm 8 recomputes the probability
for each partition automata and closure automata. So it can be seen as a PTIME
algorithm with respect to the size of partition automata.
5.4 Independent pd-processes
In pd-processes, guards {g1, g2, ..., gn} are boolean queries {q1, q2, ..., qn} on a given prob-
abilistic database D returning ”true” or ”false”. First, to evaluate the full relational
algebra problem in probabilistic databases, we will reuse the methods proposed in [38]:
each tuple of probabilistic database is annotated with a propositional formulas called
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”events” over a set of boolean variables . Table 5.2 shows an example of several proba-
bilistic tuples which add an additional attribute as events. The probability of the event
owned by a tuple equals to the probability of this tuple. For the reason of simple man-
agement of query evaluation, we assume all the original tuples with atomic events are
independent or disjoint and the other tuples derive from these original ones. The origi-
nal atomic events are not only a signature of every tuple but also represent the lineage
of every non-atomic tuple. The method to utilize the events annotated on probabilistic
database for evaluating the SPJ queries is as follows:
If assuming this query uniquely impacts on two tuples t1 with probability pr1 and event
X1, t2 with probability pr2 and event X2 from diﬀerent tables, X1 is a collection of
atomic events which are independent or disjoint and considered as the original events,
as well as X2.
• Selection from t1 and t2. Selection never change the event and probability.
• Projection from t1 and t2. If projection impacts on both tuples, the result event
is X1 +X2, the probability is the consequence of computing X1 +X2.
• Join from t1 and t2. If t1  t2, result event is X1 × X2, the probability is the
consequence of computing X1 ×X2.
Announcing that t1 and t2 may be correlate tuples meaning that X1 and X2 have
common atomic events. The computation of probability cannot be simply adding or
product. For example, if X1 = y1 + y2, X2 = y1 + y3, then X1 + X2 = y1 + y2 + y3.
The probability of this result is pr(y1) + pr(y2) + pr(y3). With the same manner, if
X1 = y1×y2, X2 = y1×y3, then X1×X2 = y1×y2×y3. The probability of this result is
pr(y1)× pr(y2)× pr(y3) . We denote E(qi) as the formula of events generated by query
qi.
Deﬁnition 5.8 (Witness events). For any boolean query qi on a probabilistic database
D, the witness events of qi denoted as we(qi) are a set of atomic events such that
we(qi) = {e| e is an atomic event that occurs in E(qi) }.
According to Deﬁnition 5.8, if the set of witness events of qi is empty, qi returns ”false”.
In the context of probabilistic database, the witness tuples are enumerated due to the
computation of probability. In Table 5.2, if there is a boolean query :”Exists: select TID
= ’101’ in T1”, E(qi) = x1 + x2 the witness events we(qi) = {x1, x2}.
Deﬁnition 5.9 (Independent guards). Two guards g1 and g2 are independent guards
w.r.t a ﬁxed probabilistic database D iﬀ we(g1) ∩ we(g2) = ∅.
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Original database
T1 TID Name Pr Event
101 A 20% x1
101 B 40% x2
212 C 70% x3
T2 SID Name Pr Event
133 A 50% y1
134 D 60% y2
276 C 40% y3
Query answer of ΠTID=101T1
T3 TID Pr Event
101 60% x1 + x2
Query answer of ΠName(T1  T2)
T4 Name Pr Event
A 10% x1 × y1
C 28% x3 × y3
Table 5.2: Example of events annotated on probabilistic database
The deﬁnitions of independent guards is the principle criteria of determining if a pd-
process can be decreased to a Markov process. The deﬁnition of independent pd-
processes which capture the features of Markov processes is introduced as follows.
Deﬁnition 5.10 (Independent pd-processes). A pd-process A = (S, s0, D,Act,G,Δ, F )
is independent pd-process if the following properties are satisﬁed.
1. the guards of all the transition relations started from a state si are independent
guards.
2. for any two guards g1 and g2 whose corresponding transition relations are outgoing
from diﬀerent states, if g1 and g2 are in the path π, g1 and g2 are independent
guards.
For the reason of simplifying notation, pd-processes indicate the normal pd-processes
whereas independent pd-processes represent the ones with the restrictions of the guards’
independence. As the descriptions in [44], a pd-process is a non-Markov process due
to the correlation of the guards (maybe common witness tuples). But Deﬁnition 5.10
implies a fact that there dose not exist correlation among guards in the same independent
guards closure or of the transition relations from same state in the context of independent
pd-processes. As a result, a theorem can be deduced from Deﬁnition 5.10 as follows.
Theorem 5.11. A pd-process is a Markov process iﬀ it is an independent pd-process.
Proof. ⇒ The states, initial state and actions in pd-process own the parallel meaning
with the ones of a Markov process. For any two transition relations δ1, δ2 stated from one
state si in a pd-process A. Here we assume there are only two transition relations started
from si. If A is a independent pd-process, the guards for δ1, δ2 are g1, g2, respectively
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and obviously, we(g1) ∩ we(g2) = ∅ for a given probabilistic database D.
If E(D) represents the set of all atomic events in D, Pr(g1) = 1 − Pr(E(D) \ we(g1)),
Pr(g2) = 1−Pr(E(D)\we(g2)) and assuming there exists an inactive transition relation
δσ whose guard is gσ with a set of witness events we(gσ) = E(D) \ (we(g1) ∪ ve(g2)),
Pr(gσ) = 1−Pr(E(D)\σ) = 1−Pr(we(g1))−Pr(we(g2)) such that Pr(g1)+Pr(g2)+
Pr(gσ) = 1, equally, Pr(δ1) + Pr(δ2) + Pr(δσ) = 1 such that the set of transition
relations started from si, Δsi ⊆ si ×Act× S can be represented as a probability space:
Δsi ⊆ si×Probs(Act×S) = Probs(si×Act×S) where Probs(si×Act×S) = {δ1, δ2, δσ}
is a probability space (Ω, F, Pr) where Ω is {δ1, δ2, δσ}, Pr(Ω) = 1, F is discrete due to
the exclusiveness of the elements in Ω.
Similarly as the step above, for a set of connected transition relationss1
a1,g1−−−→ s2 a2,g2−−−→ s3,
because g1 and g2 are in the same path so they have not common witness events, these
two transition relations s1
a1,g1−−−→ s2 and s2 a2,g2−−−→ s3 are memoryless and discrete. This
feature also coincides with the properties of Markov processes.
⇐ For any Markov process, if we consider all the probability distributions as guards, it
obviously satisﬁes the two properties of an independent pd-process.
5.4.1 Simulation test of independent pd-processes
The simulation test algorithm in the context of independent pd-processes is trivial.
Because an independent pd-process can be decreased to a Markov process, we ﬁrst
compute all the guards’ probabilities, then we run the traditional probabilistic simulation
test.
Complexity of simulation test of independent pd-processes
Let A and B be two independent pd-processes. The problem of checking whether A  B
is:
(i) in O(f(|D|)) in data complexity, where f(|D|) is the data-complexity of computing
the probabilities of a boolean query on a probabilistic database D,
(ii) PTIME w.r.t. the expression complexity,
(iii) can be solved in PTIME w.r.t. |A|+ |B|.
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5.4.2 Model checking of independent pd-processes
Similar with the simulation test, we can transform independent pd-processes to Markov
processes by computing the probability of each guard then run traditional P-LTL or
P-CTL model checking algorithms as needed.
Complexity of model checking of independent pd-processes As Proposition 5.11
described, an independent pd-process is a ﬁnite Markov Chain. The model checking
(LTL, CTL, P-LTL, P-CTL) algorithms of independent pd-processes can reuse the ones
of ﬁnite Markov Chain (Markov processes).
(i) in O(f(|D|)) in data complexity, where f(|D|) is the data-complexity of computing
the probabilities of a boolean query on a probabilistic database D,
(ii) the expression complexity is EXPTIME w.r.t P-LTL model checking, PTIME w.r.t
P-CTL model checking.
iii P-LTL model checking can be solved in EXPTIME w.r.t |φ| (φ is a LTL formula).
iv P-CTL model checking can be solved in PTIME w.r.t |Φ| × |A| (Φ is CTL formula).
Chapter 6
Related works
This chapter brieﬂy describes related work of the main contents of this thesis and shows
the diﬀerences between our contributions with these works. We mainly focus on the
related domains as follows: data-centric/data-aware business processes, probabilistic
processes, probabilistic database, veriﬁcation method on probabilistic systems. The ﬁrst
part proposes the notion of data-centric/data-aware business processes and the second
part focuses on the domain of probabilistic processes including modeling, simulation
test, veriﬁcation method in the context of probabilistic processes.
6.1 Data-centric/Data-aware business processes
Nowadays, experts do not only satisfy expressing business sequence of activities but
also the informational perspectives which normally are treated as a part of context of
single activities. The ideas of letting data play the most important role birthed data-
centric/data-aware business processes. Normally, without speciﬁc explanations, data-
centric business processes imply business artifact process. Intuitively, business artifacts
are data objects whose manipulations deﬁne the underlying processes in a business
model. Business artifact and information-centric processing of artifact life-cycles was
ﬁrst introduced in [45]. Then in [46], a business artifact processes in pharmaceutical
research were designed and industrialized as a successful business attempt. Recently,
in [47], a brand new framework based on business artifact process was proposed to
integrate artifact-centric process model, process view model, a set of consistency rules,
and the construction approach for building process views. The authors attempted to
develop a bottom-up abstraction mechanism to construct process view by deriving from
underlying process models and capturing major business requirements. Meanwhile, they
deﬁned a consistency rules to preserve the consistency between business views which were
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constructed and their corresponding processes. It can be considered as a generalization
of artifact-centric business processes.
Comparing with these formal works, we focus not only on the role played by data but
also the ﬂow perspective in the business processes. In business artifact processes, data is
dissociated from the control ﬂow perspectives and forms isolated views to illustrate the
information exchanging and data transforming during the whole business processes. Our
work directly integrates data by using guard querying probabilistic database in business
processes. It clearly observes how data inﬂuence the transition relations among diﬀerent
states to predict future.
In spite of business artifact processes, data-aware conformance and compliance check-
ing provide another way to consider the role of data played in the business processes.
In [6], authors showed an abstraction approach to avoid state explosion by conduct-
ing compliance checking which is a part of process mining extracting information from
event log for an abstract process model and abstract compliance rules. In [5], a more
eﬃcient method of data-aware conformance checking was extended from previous works
by running a realistic BPMN processes ProM and evaluated using a variety of model-
log combinations. The authors described an approach that aligns event log and model
while taking all perspectives (data and resources) into account. An automatic compo-
sition of a web service called Colombo model was introduced in [48]. Colombo model
is a framework in which web services are characterized in terms of the atomic processes
which impact on the real world (modelled as a relation database). This framework is
represented by following the notion of data-centric business process which is a control
ﬂow perspective integrating queries over relational databases as guards. In our work,
we expand the notion of guards which query translational database in Colombo model
to probabilistic guards querying probabilistic database. This change cause plenty of al-
ternations with respect to the semantic of model, algorithms of simulation relation test
and model checking. In [7], a formal speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation of data-centric service
composition was represented to follow the paradigm of service oriented architecture.
The authors use a running example of PayPal Express Checkout ﬂow by applying their
veriﬁcation and speciﬁcation approach. In their approach, the usefulness of a service
contract at diﬀerent level of sophistication was evaluated to facilitate a so called cost-
beneﬁt analysis. This analysis was decided on the time and eﬀort invested by service
providers in specifying their services. Meanwhile, the eﬀectiveness of the speciﬁcation
in detecting programmers’ errors while building applications by integrating services in
an ad-hoc manner could be measure in their future works.
Up to our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst work that discusses the integration between
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probabilistic database and business processes. In our works, guards query probabilis-
tic database instead of traditional databases. The result of these probabilistic guards
provide a probabilistic predictions for every associated transition relation. As a conse-
quence, our works can present a set of traditional processes with probabilistic distribu-
tions rather than one process. This feature will help analysers to predict the risks in the
future by these probabilistic distributions.
6.2 Probabilistic process
Probabilistic process constitute a mathematical framework for the speciﬁcation and anal-
ysis of probabilistic systems. The original work on probabilistic extensions of process
algebras were published in [49], [50] by using labelled transition systems as an opera-
tional model in which probabilities are associated to transitions relations. In [51], the
authors classiﬁed probabilistic models into three classes: reactive, generative and strat-
iﬁed. Diﬀerent probability distributions are assigned to diﬀerent actions in the reactive
model. The probabilities assigned to the outgoing transitions of one state labelled sum
up to 1. This can be considered as a coarse way to describe the notion of probabilistic
space but the probability assigned in one transition relation does not aﬀect the proba-
bility of successor states. Generative model assigned the probability to the states over
all outgoing transition relations and stratiﬁed model considered branching structure in
the context of generative model. In [52], the model of probabilistic automata was in-
troduced by capturing the notion of probabilistic space. The semantic of probabilistic
automata can be deﬁned in terms of probabilistic space. With the help of deﬁnition
of probabilistic automata, a transition relation from a state presents a probabilistic
distribution over states rather than to a single state, coinciding with the deﬁnition of
transition relations of ordinary automata. Thus, the non-deterministic choice among
diﬀerent transition relations can be considered as a probabilistic choice in the context
of probabilistic automata is addressed in this paper. Meanwhile, the simulaiton test for
probabilistic automata was given in this paper.
Besides the theories of probabilistic process, a ﬂurry of applications of probabilistic
process were implemented by researchers and engineers. In [53], the author discuss an
application to verify PAR protocol with unreliable channels by reducing the process
expression for the parallel composition of the protocol components to an expression of a
fully probabilistic process on which the versiﬁcation technique on probabilistic process
was introduced. In [54], probabilistic process was used to predict the pavement condition
rating and collect detail data in absence of sophisticated equipment or trained staﬀ in a
system called decision support system (DSS) to replace Pavement Maintenance Systems
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(PMS). In DSS, the future condition of pavement can be predicted by calculating the
collected data in terms of probability distribution of previous conditions and analysing
these data in a business process. An application of analysing the accident from the
collision of ships entering or leaving port by using probabilistic process was discussed
in [55]. In this paper, the probabilistic distribution was assigned to semi-Markov chain
to determine the probability of correct execution of critical manoeuvres during ship’s
entering and leaving the port as well as the probabilities of incorrect execution of critical
manoeuvres by a ship, that leads to marine accidents.
Our work describes another kind of probabilistic process speciﬁcation named as pd-
processes which diﬀer from these traditional models. We introduce the notion of prob-
abilistic guards to the domain of probabilistic processes. In our works, guards are
boolean queries over probabilistic databases to provide a probabilistic decision making
for corresponding transition relations. Owing to probabilistic guards, the semantic of
our pd-processes is changed from Markov perspective to non-Markov speciﬁcation. A
single pd-processes can represent a set of business processes which are described in terms
of world-partition automata with probability distribution. Therefore, the algorithms of
simulation relation and model checking are also changed to fulﬁl this semantic changes.
6.2.1 Simulation relation test
A simulation relation describes the containment relation of two ﬁnite state machines.
Intuitively, a ﬁnite state machine simulates another one if it can match all of its moves.
As a core stone of veriﬁcation technique, simulation relation test provides a reﬁnement
and abstraction tool for verifying the properties of ﬁnite state machines. In [22], a
polynomial algorithm of traditional simulation relation test was proposed and we use
it to do the simulation test between two world-partition automata in our thesis. This
algorithm is presented in Appendix. As to probabilistic processes, the simulation rela-
tion test was ﬁrstly studied in [52] as well as the model of probabilistic processes. The
algorithm of simulation relation test in the context of probabilistic processes extended
from the traditional simulation test algorithm in [22] but probability is a principle role
to be considered. In [52], authors introduced two notions of simulation relations strong
probabilistic simulation and branching probabilistic simulation with respect to proba-
bilistic processes model. Strong probabilistic simulation ignores the internal probabilistic
spaces which are the probabilistic spaces for every state but considers the global prob-
abilistic space of a probabilistic process. Branching probabilistic simulation concerns
every internal transition relations and states. Authors also proved that probabilistic
simulation are compositional and preserve P-CTL formulas and P-CTL formulas with-
out negation and existential quantiﬁcation, respectively. Regarding our work, we reuse
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the algorithm of traditional simulation relation test rather than probabilistic ones. That
is because in the context of our work, a pd-process can represent a set of transitional
ﬁnite state machine in terms of world-partition automata assigned with probabilities.
In every world-partition automaton, the probability for each transition relation is the
same value. So when we attempted to check simulation relation, we consider the value
of probability (bigger or equal) ﬁrst then check the simulation relations. Traditional
simulation relation test is adequate to check the similarity among world-partition au-
tomata. But the volume of world partition automata is exponential with respect to the
size of guards, the simulation relation test over pd-processes is in EXPTIME rather than
PTIME.
6.2.2 Model checking
There are a range of diﬀerent techniques for formal veriﬁcation. Model checking is
particularly well-ﬁt for the automated veriﬁcation of ﬁnite state systems. In the over
thirty years since its invention, model checking has achieved multiple breakthroughs,
extensively used in the hardware industry, and has become feasible for verifying many
types of software as well. By [17], the deﬁnition of model checking can be deﬁned as
follows: ”model checking is an automated technique that, given a ﬁnite-state model of
a system and a formal property, systematically checks whether this property holds for
(a given state in) that model”. The ﬁnite-state model is usually described in terms of
concurrent system (normally automata) and the properties are depicted by translating
natural languages to temporal logical formulae. The pioneering works which focused on
temporal logical modelling checking on ﬁnite-state system by introducing linear temporal
logic (LTL) were done in [56], [57] and [58]. Meantime, computational tree logical model
checking (CTL) was introduced in [59]. To fulﬁl the need of analysing uncertainty
in various domain of scientiﬁc data management, probabilistic systems (probabilistic
database, probabilistic process, etc.) were birthed. Following this trend, veriﬁcation
techniques for probabilistic models were occurred in eighties last century. The original
work was proposed in [60] by introducing a graph-based algorithm to prove not 100% sure
termination for ﬁnite state probabilistic processes. Then, the veriﬁcation of qualitative
ω-regular properties in terms of P-LTL formula for ﬁnite state system was ﬁrst studied
in [41, 61] by representing ω-regular properties in the form of deterministic non-bushi
automata. In these papers, the qualitative LTL model checking problem was proved
in PSPACE-complete. In [62], a double exponential lower bound was found for the
problem of verifying a fact that a ﬁnite state automaton was capable for a given P-
LTL formula. The problem of fairness in the context of P-LTL formula was studied in
[41, 61] by expressing restrictions on the resolution of non-determinism in ﬁnite state
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automata. A branching-time logic for probabilistic systems has been originally proposed
in [63]. Later on, a probabilistic computational tree logical model checking algorithm
was proposed in [64]. Authors gave algorithms for checking a concurrent system which
is in terms of Markov chain satisfy a given qualitative properties. As a milestone work in
the domain of probabilistic processes and veriﬁcation technique in terms of computation
tree logic, [52] presented not only the foundation of probabilistic processes but also
action-based variants of P-CTL. The probabilistic model checker was ﬂurry based on
the various theories of probabilistic process model checking. The ﬁrst prototype of P-
CTL model checkers has been proposed in [65]. Then PRISM [66], ETMCC [67], MRMC
[68] were birthed to fulﬁl the various needs of P-CTL model checking for multi models
such as Markov chain,Markov decision processes, transition matrices, etc. LiQuor [69]
is an alternative model checkers for Markov decision processes to verify quantitative
properties in this context with SPIN [70] inside as the LTL model checker.
Our work extends from these formal works. Because we are in a probabilistic system,
P-LTL and P-CTL are considered in our case. The syntax and satisfaction relations of
P-LTL and P-CTL are reused in our work. But the semantic of our work is diﬀerent from
the traditional ﬁnite state machine. The algorithm of P-LTL and P-CTL model checking
are reﬁned to fulﬁl our needs. The algorithm of P-LTL model checking on pd-processes
reuses traditional LTL model checking method for every world partition automaton.
The level of complexity dose not increased still EXPTIME but the exponent of the
complexity is the sum of the size of guards and P-LTL formulas rather than temporal
logic formulas. Similarly, P-CTL model checking on pd-processes follows the method of
traditional CTL model checking (sparse tree, searching for speciﬁcation sets for every
node of the sparse tree) but due to the exponential size of world partition automata,
the complexity of P-CTL model checking over pd-processes is EXPTIME rather than
PTIME.
Chapter 7
Prototype and Application
This section describes a prototype implementation on an application of pd-processes.
Section 7.1 describes a prototype to model the pd-processes and to test the simulation
relation between two pd-processes. The results of performance experiment on syntactic
data is illustrated in Section 7.2. Finally, Section 7.3 attempts to use the methodology
of pd-processes to model the behaviour of a realistic scenario.
7.1 The PRODUS Prototype
This prototype, called ”PRODUS” 1, a PRObabilistic Data-aware bUsiness process
Simulation framework, allows modeling the pd-processes and testing the simulation
relation between two pd-processes. Fig 7.1 shows the screenshot of PRODUS. The
programming language of PRODUS is C and the probabilistic database is powered by
PostgreSQL sever.
Figure 7.1: The PRODUS graphical user interface.
1The link of PRODUS: http://fc.isima.fr/˜li/Application.html
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Fig 7.2 depicts the global architecture of PRODUS which contains three main mod-
ules: the pd-process designer, the simulation handler, and the probabilistic database
management system.
• Pd-process designer: there are three components in this module.
– GUI: providing a graphical interface (PD-process model editor) to help users
to generate pd-processes visually.
– Pd-process model handler: (i) State handler: transferring the states descrip-
tions in the GUI to an array-list. This array-list is used to store the input
of the states; (ii) File handler: reading or writing ﬁles; (iii) Guard handler:
querying probabilistic database and returning probabilities; (iv) Transition
handler: Linking states and recording guards positions.
– Partition generator: generating guard partitions, partition automata and clo-
sure automata.
• Simulation handler: testing simulation relation between two input pd-processes.
• Probabilistic database management system: executing boolean queries on Post-
greSQL sever.
The process of modelling and testing simulation relation between two pd-processes in
PRODUS requires (i) building the transition system of the pd-processes by connecting
the states with transitions and specifying the contents of states, actions and guards in
the pd-process editor module; (ii) in the model handler module, constructing the data
structure of pd-process and resolving the guards in the guard handler module to query
the probabilistic database management system by executing a boolean query; (iii) the
P-DBMS is developed as an extension of the PostgreSQL sever which is in charge of
storing all the data with probability and evaluating probabilistic boolean query used
in pd-processes. In these probabilistic tables, probability and associated events are
considered as additional attributes; (iv) computing the probability of each member in
partitions of guards and based on it generating the partitions automata as the core
function of partition generator module; (v)simulation comparator module comparing
simulation relation by reusing the data produced by previous module; (vi) ﬁnally, the
data of pd-process is stored in an XML format or txt ﬁle by the ﬁle handler module.
7.2 Experiment
The environment of this experiment is as follows :
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Figure 7.2: The PRODUS architecture.
• CPU: Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-2430M, 2.40GHZ, 4 cores.
• RAM: Maximum 2Gb.
• Hard disk: ST9500420AS-ATA.
7.2.1 Experiment of the optimized algorithm of simulation test
This subsection brieﬂy describes the method of a performance experiment with the re-
sults through it. In the experiment, the running time and memory allocation of the
prototype are concerned as the major elements. As a convincing result, it needs to
execute the experiments numerous times. So an algorithm of generating syntactic pd-
processes automatically is called up to fulﬁl this demand. Because of the homogeneous
model of pd-process with other traditional automata, a modiﬁcation on the automatic
generation algorithm depicted in [71] is made to create typical automata rather than
tree automata according to the feature of pd-process. Due to the query on the proba-
bilistic databases by guards, automatic generation of the content of the guards is a new
challenge. Following the results of the analysis in the previous sections, the contents
of the probabilistic database do not give any impact to increase the complexity of the
framework. So we could generate a naive probabilistic relation with only one attributes,
as well as the probability distribution and homogeneous events for every tuple. Nor-
mally, users decide the number of tuple generated and the probability for each tuple is
randomly assigned a number N ∈ [0, 1]. Table 7.1 illustrates an example of automatic
generated probabilistic relation with 100 tuples.
With the help of the probabilistic relation generated as the method above, the content
of a guard can simply copy the grammar as follows:
select * from [relation name] where ID = ’[random ID number]’;
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ID Pr Events
t1 1 0.43 x1
t2 2 0.56 x2
. . . . . . . . . . . .
t100 100 0.12 x100
Table 7.1: Example of an automatic generated probabilistic database
Algorithm 9 depicts a method to generate a random pd-process. Because the names
of states is meaningless for simulation relation test, all the states are generated as
”S+the sequence number of states”. Owing to comparing simulaiton between diﬀerent
pd-processes, the action names follow the same naming rule: ”a+the sequence number of
actions”. As a result, same automatic generated pd-processes with the same or diﬀerent
size of alphabet pool can be used to test simulation relation.
Algorithm 9 Algorithm of automatic generation of pd-processes
Require:
Input state number N
Size of alphabet M
The scope of guards numbers
Ensure:
1: Pick the ﬁrst generated state as initial state;
2: Randomly pick q numbers of state as ﬁnal state with probability 0.5, 0 < q < N/2;
3: For each state which is not a ﬁnal state can randomly form a transition relation with
other states (including itself) with a probability p1;
4: Each transition relation picks up an action from the alphabet pool randomly and
have a probability p2 to own a guard;
5: The statement of the guard follows the grammar depicted as above;
6: return An automatic generated pd-process;
Fig.7.3 shows the result of the experiments. Fig.7.3(a) illustrates the memory allocation,
noticing that when the guards number reaches 9, the memory allocation hits the ceiling.
The time consuming of computing partition automata, closure automata and simulation
test is shown in (b),(c) and (d), respectively. From these results, we can learn that:
(i) the memory allocation strategy attempts to put more data in the main memory
for avoiding I/O operations. Because the number of closure automata is 2-exptime,
taking 8 guards as an example, there are 22
8
= 2256 closure automata theoretically, even
after the optimization, the number decreases around 270. It still hit the ceiling of main
memory; (ii) The average time consuming is proximately 2 hours when guard number
is 10. The major problem is the high complexity of computing closure automata as
previous tip noticed but there is not an eﬃcient way to decrease the complexity of this
step even the optimization is limited. The complexity of computing closure automata is
still bounded between EXPTIME and 2-exptime.
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Figure 7.3: Experiment results.
7.2.2 Experiment of Algorithm 8
Because Algorithm 7 is the same complexity of the previous pd-processes simulation
test algorithm, the experiments focus on the result of Algorithm 8. Fig 7.4 illustrates
the results of experiments. Figure 7.4(a) shows the memory allocation w.r.t the number
of partition automata. Because during the computation of Algorithm 8, only Table
T is maintained in the main memory. The increase of memory allocation is linear
and these is no need to record the details of each partition automaton. Figure 7.4(b)
illustrates the running time. The most principle computation of Algorithm 8 is to query
the probabilistic database. Since Table T is a hash table, the searching time can be
considered as constant. So the time consume in this step is mainly cost during the
manipulation of database.
Comparing with the result of previous experiment, based on a compiled approach, we
only need to recompute the probability of each partition automata and closure au-
tomata. The expression complexity is EXPTIME with respect to the size of partition
automata and closure automata and the data complexity is same as the one of querying
probabilistic database.
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Figure 7.4: Experiment results of Algorithm 8.
7.3 Scenario
This subsection describes a realistic scenario application in the approaching of the agri-
cultural ﬁeld by collaboration with IRSTEA. IRSTEA is a research organization which,
since more than 30 years, works on major issues of a responsible agriculture and ter-
ritories sustainable planning, water management and related risks, drought, ﬂoods, in-
undations, the biodiversity and complex ecosystems study in their interrelation with
human activities. We consider that combining the methods of probabilistic database,
GIS (Geographical Information System) and business process modelling is a new trend
to evaluate the agricultural activities. Pd-process is occasionally an ideal tool under
this context. This scenario developed with IRSTEA shows how pd-processes could be
used to evaluate the impact of agriculture activities more precisely. We attempts to
evaluate the risk of agricultural activities among the hydrological objects (lakes, rivers,
etc.) and agricultural plots. The spatial relation which provides information on the
layout of spatial objects (distance, elevation, etc.) is the most principle information
needed in the evaluation processes. Normally, this kind of information are uncertain
and consequently the available data are often not precise so that probabilistic database
is used to capture the uncertainty of the spatial objects’ information in order to estimate
the level of possible water and soil contamination (by agricultural inputs). Other than
spatial relations, the type of farming, the varieties of crops in the farm, the pesticide
utilization and other traits are also considered in this scenario to determine the risk level
of agriculture activity on a certain farm during recent years.
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Figure 7.5: Spatial relations between simple 2-D regions deﬁned in the Region Con-
nection Calculus model
Spatial relations can provide information on the layout of spatial objects [72]. As shown
in [73], there are diﬀerent types of spatial relations. For example, topological relations are
invariant under topological transformations. Metric information is provided by distance
relations. Partial and total orders can be also modeled by spatial objects (”in the front
of”, ”behind”, etc.). Numerous spatial relations have been deﬁned between diﬀerent
forms of spatial objects.
Probabilistic spatial relations can be deﬁned between objects. This type of relations
is associated to probability. In other words, we are able to assign probabilities on the
diﬀerent spatial relations.
Probabilities on topologic relations can be also deduce from a partial knowledge. To
illustrate this type of methods, we introduce an example based on traditional binary
spatial relations between simple 2-D regions (deﬁned in the Region Connection Cal-
culus model [74, 75] : Disconnected (DC), Externally Connected (EC), Equal (EQ),
Partially Overlapping (PO), Tangential Proper Part (TPP), Tangential Proper Part in-
verse (TPPi), Non-Tangential Proper Part (NTTP), Non-Tangential Proper Part inverse
(NTTPi). These relations are shown in Figure 2. All these relations are disjoint, i.e.,
there is only one spatial relation between two objects.
Suppose that we only know the three followings spatial relations between four simple
2-D regions:
• Relation 1: TPP(A, B).
• Relation 2: EC (B, C).
• Relation 3: TPP (C,D).
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R(A,B) R(B,C) R(C,D) R(A,C) R(A,D) R(B,D)
Case1 TPP EC TPP DC DC DC
Case2 TPP EC TPP DC DC EC
Case3 TPP EC TPP EC DC EC
Case4 TPP EC TPP EC DC DC
Table 7.2: Deduction of new spatial relations
Figure 7.6: Four possible layouts
From the relations 1, 2 and 3, we can deduce new spatial relations between objects using
the composition table presented in [74]. The results are in Table 7.2, Figure 7.5 shows
an example of drawing for these spatial layouts. If we assume that all the rows of the
table are equiproportional, we can determine diﬀerent probabilities:
• P (R(A,C) = DC) = 1/2 and P (R(A,C) = EC) = 1/2;
• P (R(A,D) = DC) = 1;
• P (R(B,D) = DC) = 1/2 and P (R(B,D) = EC) = 1/2;
• The probability that two relations on the three unknown relations are EC is 1/4,
etc.
Table 7.3 shows a fragment of the probabilistic database of the spatial relation ”Dis-
tance”. The AGRICULTURAL PLOT and HYDROLOGICAL OBJECT tables record
the necessary information for agricultural plots and hydrological objects. The DIS-
TANCE PLOT HYDRO table presents the distance between one hydrological object
and one agricultural plot with a probability. Our example database stores diﬀerent infor-
mation related to agricultural activities. Spatial representations of hydrological objects
(lakes, rivers, etc.) and agricultural plots used for farming activities are in the database
tables. These information are polygons. We suppose there is an intrinsic uncertainty on
the boundary of the stored hydrological objects. For example, the hydrological limits
evolve over the time. The measurement of the agricultural plots will also depend on the
used acquisition techniques. So, we suppose that the same objects can have diﬀerent
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AGRICULTURAL PLOT
ID plot Geo Area ID farm ID soil type ID watershed
AP0031 Poly{(11,32,79),(80,78,50)} 43.79 Farm0734 Soil145 Warter0427
AP0702 Poly{(68,70,67),(123,259,167)} 10.18 Farm0197 Soil145 Warter0831
HYDROLOGICAL OBJECT
ID hyd Geo Area Name
Hy0157 Poly{(65,40,20),(90,108,67)} 103.79 L’Allier river
Hy0470 Poly{(209,408,89),(520,734,54)} 306.12 Citro forest
DISTANCE PLOT HYDRO
ID plot ID hyd Distance Pr
AP0031 Hy0157 423.9 0.578
AP0031 Hy0157 320.7 0.235
AP0702 Hy0157 19.57 0.891
Table 7.3: An example of the agricultural spatial relation database schema.
representations. Consequently, the spatial relations between objects are uncertain. The
diﬀerent spatial object representations are not stored in our database, but the database
contains the diﬀerent spatial relations (with the associated probabilities) between these
objects. In this application, we are interested in using the probability of spatial rela-
tions between agricultural plots and hydro-graphical areas in order to estimate the level
of possible water and soil contamination (by agricultural inputs). The analysis of the
probabilities of contamination levels can lead to diﬀerent control actions. Because the
spatial objects are uncertain, the distances between objects are also uncertain. Here we
propose a generic database schema for probabilistic spatial relations that can be reused
in many applications. A probabilistic spatial relation schema is composed of three types
of tables:
1. Spatial objects table (SOT) stores information on spatial entities. SOTs can be
probabilistic or not. SOT tuples contain: (i) a primary key; (ii) (optional) descrip-
tive attributes;(iii) one (optional) spatial attribute (point, line, polygon, vague
shape, fuzzy spatial objects, etc.) and (iv)(optional) foreign keys. The primary
key can be composed of foreign keys or not.
2. Descriptive table (DT) stores information which are non-spatial by nature or which
could have a spatial representation but that are not important for the application.
DTs can be probabilistic or not. DT tuples contain: (i) a primary key; (ii) (op-
tional) descriptive attributes;(iii)(optional) foreign keys. The primary key can be
composed of foreign keys or not.
3. Spatial relations table (SRT) stores information on the probabilities of binary
spatial relations. SRTs can be probabilistic or not. SRT tuples contain:(i) a
primary key composed of the foreign keys coming from two SOT tuples; (ii) one
(optional) spatial relation. This attribute is optional because the spatial relation
Chapter 7. Prototype 78
Figure 7.7: Database structure of scenario
can be implicit, as in following the SRT: LEFT OF(obj a:numeric,obj b:numeric)
– in this example no additional attribute are needed to specify the spatial relations
; obj a is on the left of obj b (and consequently obj b is on the right of obj a). The
probability provides information on uncertainty of the spatial relation between two
spatial objects.
In Figure 7.7, the explanation and clariﬁcation of database tables are as follows.
SOT
• AGRICULTURAL PLOT
• HYDROLOGICAL OBJECT
• WATERSHED OBJECT
The information system considered in this example stores diﬀerent plots used for farming
activities and a set of hydrological objects such as lakes, rivers, etc. Diﬀerent watersheds
are considered.
DT
• FARM
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• USED PESTICIDE
• PESTICIDE
• PESTICIDE ACTIVE MATTER
• FARM ACTIVITY TYPE
• CROP
• CROP IN PLOT
• SOIL TYPE
• PLUVIOMETRY PER YEAR
The plots are owned by farms. Each farm has one type of activities that can be intensive,
semi-intensive or extensive. We consider here that we do not have access to information
at the ﬁnest geographical level (i.e., for each farm), but aggregated information are
available, such as the number of (semi-)intensive and extensive farms at regional level,
for large, intermediate and small farms, etc. So, a probability can be estimated for each
farm, depending on its properties (location, size, etc.). In the same way, the probabilities
of crops cultivated over the years on plots can be estimated. Probabilities on pesticides
used by farms can be also assessed. Geological information are available on the soil
of plot. These information are used to classify the plots depending on its capacity to
facilitate runoﬀ or soil inﬁltration of water and pesticides. Pesticide run oﬀ is partially
caused by rains. Global information on pluviometry is also provided.
SRT
• DISTANCE PLOT HYDRO
• ELEVATION DIFFERENCE
• DOWNHILL
Elevation diﬀerences and distances (in meters) between plots and hydrological objects
are stored in DISTANCE PLOT HYDRO and ELEVATION DIFFERENCE (only for objects
which are close). Data are stored in ELEVATION DIFFERENCE only when plot are in
downhill of hydrological objects. If one plot is in downhill of another plot, this spatial
relation is stored in the DOWNHILL table.
Fig. 7.8 illustrates the processes of the agricultural risk evaluation modelled by a pd-
process. One process evaluates the risk level of one agricultural plot with its nearby
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hydrological objects by considering the spatial relations (distance, elevation, etc.), farm-
ing type, downhill and other traits. The risk level is divided into ﬁve diﬀerent priorities
and the probabilities calculated by diﬀerent probabilistic database instances are pro-
vided by the guards to help decision-makers to decide to perform or not controls on a
plot. Fig. 7.9 presents another two agricultural activities risk evaluation processes to
compare with the previous. Fig. 7.9(A) shows the process to evaluate the grape planting
farms and Fig. 7.9(B) demonstrates the apple cultivating farms evaluation process. To
avoid creating extra spaces, the simulation test is used to determine whether the expres-
sive power of one process is contained by another one. So we did simulation test of the
processes in Fig. 7.9 with the process in Fig. 7.8. The result in Fig. 7.9(A) is simulated
and Fig. 7.9(B) returns negative result. That is because the process in Fig. 7.8 consid-
ers general cases and grape planting are fortunately in this scope. Moreover, pesticides
are widely used when cultivates apples. Experts should investigate every non-biometric
samples manually to determine the pollution level.
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Figure 7.8: An agricultural activities risk evaluation process
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Figure 7.9: Another two agricultural activities risk evaluation processes
Chapter 8
Conclusion and Perspective
This thesis demonstrates a new model integrating probabilistic database and business
processes named probabilistic data-aware business processes. The technique contribu-
tions focus on the formal deﬁnition of pd-processes the description of the semantic of
pd-processes in terms of possible execution trees, the decomposition of pd-processes to
partition automata, simulation relation test algorithm and model checking methods.
Within the simulation test algorithm in the context of pd-processes, Theorem 4.3 de-
scribes a basic method and several optimized algorithms are proposed in the dimension
of determinism, non-determinism of transition relations and compared approach of data
alternation. We proved that the expression complexity of simulation relation testing over
pd-processes is generally 2-EXPTIME and we can optimize it approaching EXPTIME
(EXPTIME is the lower bound of testing simulation relation over pd-processes). Model
checking methods focus on P-LTL and P-CTL formulae which meet pd-processes. The
complexity of P-LTL checking dose not exceed the one of traditional probabilistic sys-
tems, still in EXPTIME. But the complexity of P-CTL model checking on pd-processes
is in EXPTIME rather than PTIME in traditional cases. After veriﬁcation methods, a
way to identify pd-processes to Markov processes is discussed. We propose the notion
of independent pd-processes which has a lower complexity of veriﬁcation methods. Our
work is implemented in the PRODUS prototype and experimented in the agricultural
domain.
Perspective
The management of probabilistic data will be an increasingly important area over the
next several years as businesses, governments, and scientiﬁc researchers contend with
an ever-expanding amount of data. Although the space of applications will be diverse,
there will be fundamental primitives common to many of these applications (just as
there with standard, deterministic data). As a result, there will be a need for a general
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purpose probabilistic data-aware business process management frameworks which can
model, verify and analyse probabilistic data in a control-ﬂow perspective. Our work will
focus on enriching the functions of PRODUS, integrating more veriﬁcation methods such
as P-LTL and P-CTL model checking by reusing open sourced tools in it. Currently, our
realistic scenario is only in the domain of agriculture but the research of probabilistic data
has already reached various ﬁeld such as sensor networks, health care, ﬁnancial services
or business intelligence. We will try to expand the usage of pd-processes in capable
of more applications to forecast data, to tackle current data management problems
and to help an analyst to interactively explore and understand a large collection of
probabilistic data in a business process management system. Meanwhile, we will attempt
to simplify the veriﬁcation methods of pd-processes to decrease the complexity and dig
on more properties. Probabilistic data-aware business processes are only one model of
non-Markov processes by integrating databases into business processes. Investigating
more general cases of data-aware business processes such as regarding diﬀerent types
of database such as incomplete database, uncertain database, etc.., will be a long term
work.
Appendix A
Appendix
A.1 Traditional simulation relation test
The main idea of transitional simulation test is to check the containment of two ﬁnite
state machines by considering actions assigned with the transition relation regardless
the name of states. The eﬃcient simulation test algorithm of ﬁnite state automata has
been proposed in [22]. It is illustrated as follows:
For two ﬁnite state automataA = (S, s0, Act,Δ, F, L,AP ) andA
′ = (S′, s′0, Act′,Δ′, F ′, L′
, AP ′), to check if A  A′, we check for any δ, if there exist δ′ and their simulator set
sim(δ) and sim(δ′) such that δ ∈ sim(δ′) and δ′ ∈ Δ′. Simulator set sim(δ) stands
for a set of transition relations {δ′i|δ′i ∈ Δ′} with the same action assigned with δ. The
algorithm of simulation test is depicted in Algorithm 10. In this algorithm, the nota-
tion pre(δ) stands for the predecessor transition relations of δ, presim(δ) for all the
candidates of sim(δ), remove(δ) for recording the transition relations removed from
presim(δ), delta′′ representing the transition relations in remove(δ). The complexity of
this algorithm is in O(mn) if |m| is the size of A and n is the size of A′.
A.2 Model checking
Because in this thesis, PLTL model checking and PCTL model checking methods are
not used. They are presented in the appendix.
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Algorithm 10 Algorithm of simulation test
Require:
A  A′
Ensure:
1: for all δ ∈ Δ do;
2: let prevsim(δ) = Δ′
3: if post(δ) == ∅ then
4: sim(δ) = {δ′ ∈ Δ′|Act(δ) = Act(δ′)}.
5: else
6: sim(δ) = {δ′ ∈ Δ′|Act(δ) = Act(δ′)&&post(δ′) = ∅}.
7: end if
8: remove(δ) = pre(Δ)n(sim(δ))
9: while there is δ ∈ Δ such that remove(δ) = ∅ do
10: assert for all δ ∈ Δ , remove(δ) = pre(prevsim(δ))upslopepre(sim(δ))
11: for all δ′ ∈ pre(δ) do
12: for all δ′′ ∈ remove(δ) do
13: if δ′′ ∈ sim(δ′) then
14: sim(δ′) = sim(δ′)nδ′′;
15: for all δ′′ ∈ pre(δ′′) do
16: if post(δ′′) ∩ sim(δ′) == ∅ then remove(δ′) = remove(δ′) ∪ δ′′.
17: end for
18: end if
19: end for
20: end for
21: end while
22: let prevsim(δ) = sim(δ).
23: remove(δ) = ∅
24: return True or false.
A.2.1 P-LTL model checking
Following the deﬁnition of P-LTL, the method of applying P-LTL model checking is as
follows:
1. A given probabilistic transition system A = (S, s0, Act,Δ, AP, L) and LTL formula
ϕ over AP checking Pr(ϕ) >= c (c is a constant).
2. Do the regular LTL model checking and attempting to ﬁnd a counterexample
satisfying Pr(¬ϕ) >= 1− c.
3. Return true or false following a counterexample with probability.
A.2.2 P-CTL model checking
Similar method as CTL, we consider the 3 types of path formulae operators (next, until
and bounded until)
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• Next
– Compute Prob(s,©Φ) for all s ∈ S. Prob(s,©Φ) = ∑s′∈Sat(Φ) P (s, s′)
where P (s, s′) presents the probability from s to s′.
– Compute vector Prob(©Φ) of probabilities for all the states.
In fact, this algorithm equals to another method: compute the probability for every
state, then ﬁnd which states satisfy the given Φ not only the temporal formulae
but also the probability restrictions.
• Bounded Until and Unit To compute the bounded until case denoted as π 
Φ1 ∪n Φ2, we have the method as follows:
– Identify states with probability 1/0. As a result, we have Syes = Sat(Φ2),
Sno = S \ (Sat(Φ1)
⋃
Sat(Φ2), S
? = S \ (Syes⋃Sno).
– Then we compute the solution of recursive equations, Prob(s,Φ1 ∪k Φ2) =
∗ 1, if s ∈ Syes.
∗ 0, if s ∈ Sno.
∗ 0, if s ∈ S?, k = 0.
∗ ∑s′∈S P (s, s′)× Prob(s′,Φ1 ∪k Φ2).
– similar with ”next” operator, we compute the result of Prob(s,Φ1∪kΦ2) by
matrix-vector multiplication. By contrast, there needs k times matrix-vector
multiplication.
– Until can be seen as a Bounded Until without bound.
To check ifM  Φ, ifM is a probabilistic process, the complexity is O((|M |)×nmax×|Φ|)
where nmax is the maximal step bound in a sub-path formula Φ1 ∪n Φ2.
A.3 Algorithm of intersection of probabilistic boolean queries
Because in the current state of art, there is not a tool capable to handle the intersection
of probabilistic boolean queries.But in our case, the intersection of probabilistic boolean
queries is principle to build partition of guards or partition automata. So we need
to implement our own algorithm of probabilistic boolean queries. The algorithm of
intersection depicts in Algorithm 11:
Here is the explanation of the Algorithm 11.
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Algorithm 11 Algorithm of intersection of probabilistic boolean queries
Require:
Two probabilistic boolean queries q1 and q2;
q1 intersect with q2.
Ensure:
1: if q1 = ∅ or q2 = ∅ then
2: return Pr = 0
3: else
4: Rewrite q1 and q2 as R1 and R2, respectively;
5: E1 = ΠEventR1, E2 = ΠEventR2;
6: E3 = E1 × E2;
7: E4 = Merge(E3)
8: Etrim = Distinct(E4)
9: Pr(Etrim) = 1−
∏
∀Xi(1− prXi), Xi is the events of Etrim.
10: return Etrim and Pr(Etrim);
11: end if
• Rewrite Rewrite q1 and q2 returning tables of query answer rather than boolean
values. This rewrite returns two relationsR1 with a collection of tuples{t11, t12, ...t1i},
and R2 with a collection of tuples{t21, t22, ...t2j}, for each tuple tmk, m = 1 or 2 ,
a probability prmk and an event Xmk associating with it, respectively.
• Merge E3 Merge the two columns for each tuple of E3 to form a new Relation E4
which has only one attribute as follows: assuming X1 is the value of ﬁrst attribute
and X2 is the value of second attribute of E3, Y1 is the merge result such that
Y1 = X1 ×X2 and each atomic event in X3 is distinct.
• Distinct E4 Distinct the tuple of E4 as follows: if Y1 and Y2 are the values of
diﬀerent tuples of E4, considering Y1 and Y2 are two sets which contain a set of
events as elements following the rules below: assuming y1 and y2 are two atomic
events of Y1,i if y1 × y2, y1 and y2 are separated as two elements in set Y1;ii if
y1 + y2, they are considered as one element. Following this manner, the elements
connecting with × are separated otherwise they are considered as an entirety by
connecting with +. So if Y1 ⊆ Y2, delete Y2. As a result, Etrim is build deriving
from E4;
Proof
This part attempts to prove Algorithm 11. Algorithm 11 describes a method to evaluate
intersection of probabilistic boolean queries such that i rewriting the boolean queries to
ordinary queries which return relations of query answer. This step ensures that all the
tuples involved in this intersection query process are captured in the relations of query
answer which rewrites the original boolean query, with the help of events which can be
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considered as the lineage of the query. ii after rewriting, the probability of intersection
of probabilistic boolean queries is computed according to lemma as follows.
Lemma A.1. For given boolean queries q1 and q2, R1 and R2 are their rewriting re-
lations of query answer, according to Algorithm 11, Etrim is built such that Pr(q1 IN-
TERSECT q2) = Pr(Etrim).
The proof of Lemma A.1 is explained as follows.
Proof.
• If PW1 and PW2 stand for the possible worlds of q1 and q2 respectively, the possible
world of the intersection result is PW1 ∩ PW2.
• Denote T1 = {t11, t12, ..., t1n} as a set of tuples of the answer of q1 and T2 =
{t21, t22, ..., t2m} as a set of tuples of the answer of q2. For each tuple tkl, k = 1or2,
there is an event ekl annotated, which contains a set of atomic events. This event
ekl presents a closure of possible worlds in which all the atomic events of ekl are
true, denoted as CPWekl .
• As a result, PW1 =
⋃1
i=nCPWe1i and PW2 =
⋃1
j=mCPWe2j . So PW1 ∩ PW2 =
⋃1
i=nCPWe1i ∩
⋃1
j=mCPWe2j =
⋃1
i=n(
⋃1
j=m(CPWe1i ∩ CPWe2j )
• If we rewrite the query answer of q1 and q2 to two relations R1 and R2 rather
than boolean values, such that PWR1 = PW1 and PWR2 = PW2. E1 and E2
present the set of events of R1 and R2. Obviously, E1 is the projection on the
attribute Event of R1 as well as E2. If we consider E1 and E2 are two sets,
E1 = {e11, e12, ..., e1n} and E2 = {e21, e22, ..., e2m}, PWE1 =
⋃1
i=nCPWe1i = PW1
and PWE2 =
⋃1
j=mCPWe2j = PW2.
• E3 = E1 × E2 = {(e11, e21), (e12, e21), ..., (e1i, e2j), ..., (e1n, e2m)}
• E4 = Merge(E3) such that PWE4 = {CPWe11∩CPWe21 , ..., CPWe1i∩CPWe2j , ...,
CPWe1n ∩ CPWe2m}.
• Etrim = Distinct(E4) such that PWEtrim = (CPWe11∩CPWe21)∪· · ·∪(CPWe1i∩
CPWe2j ) ∪ · · · ∪ (CPWe1n ∩ CPWe2m)
• Finally, Etrim = PW1 ∩ PW2, Algorithm 11 is conﬁrmed.
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A.4 Spatial relation
In this section, two more methods to determine the probability of spatial relation is
provided.
A.4.1 Method 1
Suppose ﬁve data sources. Data sources 1, 2, 3 store diﬀerent spatial representations
of the same objects A. Data sources 4, 5 store diﬀerent spatial representations of
the same object B. These diﬀerent representations are caused by the uses of diﬀerent
measurement techniques. Fig. provides an example of the instances A and B of the
ﬁve data sources; di is the diﬀerent possible minimal distances between A and B. We
consider that only one data source stores the correct representation for the object A
(1, 2 or 3) - but we do not know which one is correct. In the same manner, only
one data source stores the correct representation for the object B (4 or 5) - but the
correct source is unknown. So, if we make the hypothesis that all the rows of Table A.1
are equiproportional events: p(d1) = 1/6, p(d2) = 1/2 and p(d3) = 2/3. In other word,
if we do not know which data source stores the correct representation (for A and B),
the probabilities that d1 is the correct distance is 1/6, etc. Note that the distance that
minimizes the risk (i.e., the wrong choice) is d2. An order can be also provided between
these distances (d2 < d1 < d3) and probabilities of other events can be calculated: for
example, p(<= d1) = 5/6, i.e., the probability that the minimal distance is less than or
equal to d1 is 5/6.
Figure A.1: Spatial representation of two objects represented in ﬁve data sources.
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Source 1 Source 2 Source 3 Source 4 Source 5 Correct distance
correct incorrect incorrect correct incorrect d1
incorrect correct incorrect correct incorrect d2
incorrect incorrect correct correct incorrect d2
correct incorrect incorrect incorrect correct d3
incorrect correct incorrect incorrect correct d2
incorrect incorrect correct incorrect correct d2
Table A.1: Diﬀerent hypotheses on the data source reliability
A.4.2 Method 2
Probabilistic spatial relations can be also calculated in the context of moving objects.
Suppose that two commands are sent to a robot A controlled remotely:
1. A has to turn in an angle of 90 degrees.
2. Then, A have to walk 1 meter.
Due to the used robot material, the actions of the robot have a certain level of errors:
+/ − [0..20] degrees when A turns and +/ − [0..20]% for the covered distance. The
possible positions for the robots are represented in Figure 4. The robot A is represented
by a point drawn in bold. Pos1 is its initial position and Pos2 is its ﬁnal position if the
robot material has no error. If we consider the errors, the boundary of possible ﬁnal
positions (denoted by D) is represented by a polygon drawn in bold. This boundary
is calculated using the maximal angle error and the maximal covered distance error.
Consequently, the topological relations between A and the rectangular object O are
uncertain. Probabilities can be calculated for these spatial relations by comparing the
surface area of D ∩O with the surface area of D.
Figure A.2: Possible positions for the robot A.
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